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Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action
12-682
Ruling Below: Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Michigan, 701 F.3d
466 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 1633.
In support of affirmative action efforts, organizations and individuals with ties to Michigan state
universities filed suits against state officials and universities to seek declaratory judgments
stating the constitutional amendment prohibiting affirmative action in public education,
employment, and contracting violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. After consolidation,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan entered summary judgment
in state's favor, denied law student's motion to intervene, and denied plaintiffs' motion to alter or
amend judgment.
Questions Presented: Whether a state violates the Equal Protection Clause by amending its
constitution to prohibit race- and sex-based discrimination or preferential treatment in publicuniversity admissions decisions.

COALITION TO DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, INTEGRATION AND
IMMIGRANT RIGHTS AND FIGHT FOR EQUALITY BY ANY MEANS
NECESSARY (BAMN), et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants,
v.
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, Board of Trustees of Michigan
State University; Board of Governors of Wayne State University; Mary Sue Coleman;
Irvin D. Reid; Lou Anna K. Simon, Defendants–Appellees
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Decided: November 15, 2012.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
COLE, Circuit Judge:
A student seeking to have her family’s
alumni connections considered in her
application to one of Michigan’s esteemed
public universities could do one of four
things to have the school adopt a legacyconscious admissions policy: she could

lobby the admissions committee, she could
petition the leadership of the university, she
could seek to influence the school’s
governing board, or, as a measure of last
resort, she could initiate a statewide
campaign to alter the state’s constitution.
The same cannot be said for a black student
seeking the adoption of a constitutionally
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permissible race-conscious
admissions
policy. That student could do only one thing
to effect change: she could attempt to amend
the Michigan Constitution—a lengthy,
expensive, and arduous process—to repeal
the consequences of Proposal 2. The
existence of such a comparative structural
burden undermines the Equal Protection
Clause’s guarantee that all citizens ought to
have equal access to the tools of political
change. We therefore REVERSE the
judgment of the district court on this issue
and find Proposal 2 unconstitutional. We
AFFIRM the denial of the University
Defendants’ motion to be dismissed as
parties, and we AFFIRM the grant of the
Cantrell Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment as to Russell.
I.
A. Factual Background
[Affirmative action] challenges in the late
1990s culminated in the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Gratz v. Bollinger, and Grutter
v. Bollinger, which held that “universities
cannot establish quotas for members of
certain racial groups” or treat their
applications uniquely.
But the Court
allowed
universities
to
continue
“consider[ing] race or ethnicity more
flexibly as a ‘plus’ factor in the context of
individualized consideration,” along with
other relevant factors, a holding we do not
today address or upset.
Following these decisions, Ward Connerly,
a former University of California Regent
who had championed a similar proposition
in California, and Jennifer Gratz, the lead
plaintiff in Gratz, mobilized to place on

Michigan’s November 2006 statewide ballot
a proposal to amend the Michigan
Constitution “to prohibit all sex- and racebased preferences in public education,
public
employment,
and
public
contracting....” The initiative—officially
designated Proposal 06–2 but commonly
known as “Proposal 2”—sought “to amend
the State Constitution to ban affirmative
action programs.” Though Proposal 2
“found its way on the ballot through
methods that undermine[d] the integrity and
fairness of our democratic processes,” once
there, it garnered enough support among
Michigan voters to pass by a margin of 58%
to 42%...
Proposal 2 took effect in December 2006
and wrought two significant changes to the
admissions policies at Michigan’s public
colleges and universities. First, it eliminated
the consideration of “race, sex, color,
ethnicity,
or
national
origin”
in
individualized
admissions
decisions,
modifying policies in place for nearly a halfcentury. No other admissions criterion—for
example, grades, athletic ability, geographic
diversity, or family alumni connections—
suffered the same fate. Second, Proposal 2
entrenched this prohibition at the state
constitutional level, thus preventing public
colleges and universities or their boards
from revisiting this issue—and only this
issue—without repeal or modification of
article I, section 26 of the Michigan
Constitution.
B. Procedural History
On November 8, 2006, the day after
Proposal 2 passed, a collection of interest
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groups and individuals, including the
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,
Integration and Immigration Rights and
Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary
(“Coalition Plaintiffs”), filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan. They named as
defendants
then-Governor
Jennifer
Granholm, the Regents of the University of
Michigan, the Board of Trustees of
Michigan State University, and the Board of
Governors of Wayne State University
(“University Defendants”), and alleged that
the provisions of Proposal 2 affecting public
colleges and universities violated the United
States Constitution and federal statutory law.
The Coalition Plaintiffs limited their request
for relief to Proposal 2 as it applies to public
education, and did not challenge its
constitutionality as it applies to public
employment or public contracting. About a
month later, the Michigan Attorney General
(“Attorney General”) filed a motion to
intervene as a defendant, which the district
court granted. Shortly thereafter, Eric
Russell, then an applicant to the University
of Michigan Law School, and Toward A
Fair Michigan (“TAFM”), a non-profit
corporation
formed
to
ensure
implementation of Proposal 2, also filed a
motion to intervene in the litigation.

postponing the application of Proposal 2 to
the universities’ admissions and financialaid policies until July 1, 2007, which was
the conclusion of the 2006–2007 admissions
and financial-aid cycle. The district court’s
order stemmed from a stipulation among the
University Defendants, Coalition Plaintiffs,
Granholm, and the Attorney General
consenting to the injunction. While awaiting
approval as intervenors, Russell and TAFM
opposed the Attorney General’s stipulation
and sought a stay of the injunction from the
district court. When two days passed
without a ruling on their motions, Russell
and TAFM filed with us an “Emergency
Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal,” which
we granted. Meanwhile, we approved the
district court’s decision to allow only
Russell to intervene in the Proposal 2
litigation.

On December 19, 2006, a group of faculty
members and prospective and current
students at the University of Michigan
(“Cantrell Plaintiffs”) filed a separate but
similar suit …

On October 5, 2007, the Cantrell Plaintiffs
filed a motion for summary judgment as to
Russell, arguing that he should be dismissed
from the litigation because he no longer
represented an interest distinct from that of
the Attorney General. On October 17, 2007,
the University Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that they were not
necessary parties to the litigation. On
November 30, 2007, the Attorney General
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing
or, in the alternative, a motion for summary
judgment on the merits as to all Plaintiffs.
Russell and the Cantrell Plaintiffs likewise
filed motions for summary judgment the
same day.

That same day, the district court issued what
was, in effect, a preliminary injunction,

On March 18, 2008, the district court issued
two orders addressing these motions. First,
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the court denied the University Defendants’
request to be dismissed as parties and the
Cantrell Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment. The court also granted the
Attorney General’s motion for summary
judgment, rejecting the Plaintiffs’ arguments
that Proposal 2 violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, the court granted the Cantrell
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment,
dismissing Russell as an intervenor. The
Cantrell Plaintiffs subsequently moved the
court to reconsider the first order, but the
court denied the motion.
The Plaintiffs, the University Defendants,
and Russell appealed these orders to this
Court. A panel of this Court reversed the
district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of the Attorney General, concluding
that the portions of Proposal 2 that affect
Michigan’s public institutions of higher
education impermissibly alter the political
process in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. This Court also affirmed the district
court’s dismissal of Russell and the denial of
the University Defendants’ motion to be
dismissed. The Attorney General then
sought en banc review, which we granted,
vacating the panel opinion.

II.
A. Constitutionality of Proposal 2
The Plaintiffs argue that Proposal 2 violates
[the Equal Protection Clause] in two distinct
ways. Both Plaintiff groups argue that
Proposal 2 violates the Equal Protection
Clause by impermissibly restructuring the
political process along racial lines (the

“political process” argument), and the
Coalition Plaintiffs additionally argue that
Proposal 2 violates the Equal Protection
Clause by impermissibly classifying
individuals on the basis of race (the
“traditional” argument).
In addressing the Plaintiffs’ arguments, we
are neither required nor inclined to weigh in
on the constitutional status or relative merits
of race-conscious admissions policies as
such…
We review de novo a district court’s grant of
summary judgment and denial of a motion
for reconsideration of that decision.
Whether a state’s constitution violates the
federal constitution is a question of law,
which we also review de novo.
1. Equal Protection Within the Political
Process
The Equal Protection Clause “guarantees
racial minorities the right to full
participation in the political life of the
community. It is beyond dispute ... that
given racial or ethnic groups may not be
denied the franchise, or precluded from
entering into the political process in a
reliable
and
meaningful
manner.”
Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458
U.S. 457, 467 (1982). But the Equal
Protection Clause reaches even further,
prohibiting “a political structure that treats
all individuals as equals, yet more subtly
distorts governmental processes in such a
way as to place special burdens on the
ability of minority groups to achieve
beneficial legislation.” “[T]he State may no
more disadvantage any particular group by
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making it more difficult to enact legislation
in its behalf than it may dilute any person’s
vote or give any group a smaller
representation than another of comparable
size.” Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393
(1969).
The Supreme Court’s statements in Hunter
and Seattle emphasize that equal protection
of the laws is more than a guarantee of equal
treatment under existing law…. Ensuring the
fairness of the political process is
particularly important because an electoral
minority is disadvantaged by definition in its
attempts to pass legislation; this is especially
true of “discrete and insular minorities,”
who face unique additional hurdles.
Ensuring a fair political process is nowhere
more important than in education. Education
is the bedrock of equal opportunity and “the
very foundation of good citizenship.” Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
Safeguarding the guarantee “that public
institutions are open and available to all
segments of American society, including
people of all races and ethnicities, represents
a paramount government objective.”
…Therefore, in the high-stakes context of
education, we must apply the politicalprocess doctrine with the utmost rigor.
Of course, the Constitution does not protect
minorities from political defeat… We must
therefore have some way to differentiate
between the constitutional and the
impermissible. And Hunter and Seattle
provide just that. They set the benchmark for
when the majority has not only won, but has
rigged the game to reproduce its success

indefinitely.
a. Hunter v. Erickson
In Hunter, the citizens of Akron, Ohio,
overturned a fair housing ordinance enacted
by the City Council. [T]he citizens amended
the city charter through a referendum to
require the approval of an electoral majority
before any ordinance regulating real estate
“on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin or ancestry”—past or
future—could take effect. In other words,
only ordinances based on those factors
required a city-wide majority; ordinances
based on any other factor required just a
vote by the City Council…
The referendum halted operation of the
existing fair housing ordinance, and more
importantly for our purposes, erected a
barrier to any similar ordinance in the future.
The Supreme Court found that the disparity
between the process for enacting a future
fair housing ordinance and the process for
enacting any other housing ordinance
“place[d] special burden[s] on racial
minorities within the governmental process”
by making it “substantially more difficult to
secure enactment” of legislation that would
be to their benefit.…
b. Washington v. Seattle School District
No. 1
In Seattle, a case that mirrors the one before
us, the Supreme Court applied Hunter to
strike down a state statute, also enacted via a
referendum,
that
prohibited
racially
integrative busing. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 463.
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Prior to the referendum, Seattle School
District No. 1 (“District”) had implemented
a school desegregation plan that made
extensive use of mandatory reassignments…
[T]he school board implemented the plan to
accelerate its existing program of voluntary
busing, which some constituencies saw as
insufficiently alleviating racial imbalances.
In response, Seattle residents drafted a
statewide measure—known as Initiative
350—providing in relevant part that “no
school board ... shall directly or indirectly
require any student to attend a school other
than the school which is geographically
nearest or next nearest the student’s place of
residence....” Though the initiative was
framed as a general ban on mandatory
busing, its myriad exceptions made its real
effect
the
elimination
of
school
reassignments for racial purposes only,
except where a court ordered such
reassignments to remedy unconstitutional
segregation. Initiative 350 made it on the
Washington ballot and passed by a
substantial margin.
The Court found that Initiative 350, like the
Akron city charter amendment, violated the
Equal Protection Clause. The Court stated
that its prior cases yielded a “simple but
central principle”: while “laws structuring
political institutions or allocating political
power according to neutral principles” do
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, “a
different analysis is required when the State
allocates governmental power nonneutrally,
by explicitly using the racial nature of a
decision to determine the decisionmaking
process.” Seattle, 458 U.S. at 469–70.

Echoing Hunter, the Court explained that
this distinct analysis is necessary because
non-neutral allocations of power “place [ ]
special burdens on racial minorities within
the governmental process, thereby making it
more difficult for certain racial and religious
minorities than for other members of the
community to achieve legislation that is in
their interest…
In sum, Hunter and Seattle require us to
examine an enactment that changes the
governmental decisionmaking process for
legislation with a racial focus to determine if
it improperly manipulates the channels for
change. To the extent that it does, we must
strike down the enactment absent a
compelling state interest.
2. Application of the Hunter/Seattle Test to
Proposal 2
Hunter and Seattle thus expounded the rule
that an enactment deprives minority groups
of the equal protection of the laws when it:
(1) has a racial focus, targeting a policy or
program that “inures primarily to the benefit
of the minority”; and (2) reallocates political
power or reorders the decisionmaking
process in a way that places special burdens
on a minority group’s ability to achieve its
goals through that process. See Seattle, 458
U.S. at 467, 472, 102 S.Ct. 3187; Hunter,
393 U.S. at 391, 89 S.Ct. 557. Applying this
rule here, we conclude that Proposal 2
targets a program that “inures primarily to
the benefit of the minority” and reorders the
political process in Michigan in a way that
places special burdens on racial minorities.
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a. Racial Focus
The first prong of the Hunter/Seattle test
requires us to determine whether Proposal 2
has a “racial focus.” This inquiry turns on
whether the targeted policy or program, here
holistic race-conscious admissions policies
at public colleges and universities, “at
bottom inures primarily to the benefit of the
minority, and is designed for that
purpose.”…
Seattle conclusively answers whether a law
targeting policies that seek to facilitate
classroom diversity, as Proposal 2 does, has
a racial focus. In Seattle, the Court observed
that programs intended to promote school
diversity and further the education of
minority children enable these students to
“achieve their full measure of success.”…
Accordingly, the Court noted that
“desegregation of the public schools ... at
bottom inures primarily to the benefit of the
minority....” Because minorities could
“consider busing for integration to be
‘legislation that is in their interest,’ ” the
Court concluded that Initiative 350’s
effective repeal of such programs had a
racial focus sufficient to “trigger application
of the Hunter doctrine.”
The logic of the Court’s decision in Seattle
applies with equal force here. Proposal 2
targets race-conscious admissions policies
that
“promote
[
]
‘cross-racial
understanding,’ help[ ] to break down racial
stereotypes, and ‘enable[ ] students to better
understand persons of different races.’ ”…
There is no material difference between the
enactment in Seattle and Proposal 2, as both
targeted policies that benefit minorities by

enhancing their educational opportunities
and promoting classroom diversity…
Seattle not only mandates our conclusion
that Proposal 2 is racially focused, but it also
dispels any notion that the benefit raceconscious admissions policies may confer
on the majority undercuts its “racial focus.”
Although it is true that increased
representation of racial minorities in higher
education benefits all students, the Supreme
Court has made clear that these policies still
have a racial focus.
…
We find that the holistic race-conscious
admissions policies now barred by Proposal
2 inure primarily to the benefit of racial
minorities, and that such groups consider
these policies to be in their interest. Indeed,
we need not look further than the approved
ballot language—characterizing Proposal 2
as an amendment “to ban affirmative action
programs”—to confirm that this legislation
targets race-conscious admissions policies
and, insofar as it prohibits consideration of
applicants’ race in admissions decisions, that
it has a racial focus.
b. A Reordering of the Political Process
That Burdens Racial Minorities
The second prong of the Hunter/Seattle test
asks us to determine whether Proposal 2
reallocates political power or reorders the
political process in a way that places special
burdens on racial minorities. We must first
resolve (1) whether the affected admissions
procedures lie within the “political process,”
and then (2) whether Proposal 2 works a
“reordering” of this political process in a
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way that imposes “special burdens” on racial
minorities.
i. Proposal 2’s Effect on a “Political
Process”
The breadth of Proposal 2’s influence on a
“political process” turns on the role the
popularly elected governing boards of the
universities play in setting admissions
procedures. The key question is whether the
boards had the power to alter the
universities’ admissions policies prior to the
enactment of Proposal 2. If the boards had
that power and could influence the use (or
non-use) of race-conscious admissions
policies, then Proposal 2’s stripping of that
power works a reordering of the political
process because minorities can no longer
seek to enact a type of legislation that is in
their interest at the board level. But if board
members lacked such power, because policy
decisions are actually under the control of
politically unaccountable faculty members
or admissions committees, then Proposal 2’s
effect on the political process is negligible…
The Michigan Constitution establishes three
public universities—the University of
Michigan, Michigan State University, and
Wayne State University—and grants control
of each to a governing board. These boards
have the same role: to run, with plenary
authority, their respective institutions.
Michigan law has consistently confirmed
this absolute authority…
Eight popularly elected individuals sit on
these boards, and they hold office for eight
years. The boards have the “power to enact
ordinances, by-laws and regulations for the

government of the university. Exercising
this power, the boards have enacted
bylaws—which they have complete
authority to revise or revoke—detailing
admissions procedures.
The University of Michigan’s bylaws
delegate the day-to-day management of
undergraduate admissions to the associate
vice provost and executive director of
undergraduate admissions. Although the
board delegates this responsibility, it
continues
to
exercise
ultimate
decisionmaking authority because it directly
appoints the associate vice provost and
executive director
of undergraduate
admissions, and because it retains the power
to revoke or alter the admissions framework.
Nothing prevents the board from adopting
an entirely new framework for admissions
decisions if it is so inclined…
[T]he board fulfills its general supervisory
role by conducting monthly public meetings
to remain apprised of all university
operations and by exercising its power to
amend bylaws or revise delegations of
responsibility. At these meetings, the board
regularly discusses admissions practices,
including the use of race-conscious
admissions policies. Thus, the elected
boards of Michigan’s public universities
can, and do, change their respective
admissions policies, making the policies
themselves part of the political process. But
even if they did not, the Attorney General
provides no authority to support his
contention that an unused power is a power
abandoned.

102

Nevertheless, the Attorney General argues,
echoed by the dissenters, that admissions
decisions lie outside the political process
because the governing boards of the
universities
have
“fully
delegated”
responsibility for establishing admissions
standards to politically unaccountable
admissions
committees
and
faculty
members. But the Michigan Constitution,
state statutes, and the universities’ bylaws
and current practices directly contradict this
argument…
Moreover, to the extent the Attorney
General and the dissenters express concern
over the degree to which the board has
delegated admissions decisions, that
delegation does not affect whether
admissions decisions should be considered
part of the political process…
Telling evidence that board members can
influence admissions policies—bringing
such policies within the political process—is
that these policies can, and do, shape the
campaigns of candidates seeking election to
one of the boards. As the boards are
popularly elected, citizens concerned with
race-conscious admissions policies may
lobby for candidates who will act in
accordance with their views—whatever they
are. Board candidates have, and certainly
will continue, to include their views on raceconscious admissions policies in their
platforms… Once elected, the new slate may
revise the bylaws, and change their
university’s admissions policies—either by
entirely revoking the delegation and
handling all admissions policies at the board
level or by enacting new bylaws giving

more explicit direction to admissions
committees. Thus, Proposal 2 affects a
“political process.”
ii. Reordering of a “Political Process”
The next issue is whether Proposal 2
reordered the political process in a way that
places special burdens on racial minorities.
The Supreme Court has found that both
implicit and explicit reordering violates the
Fourteenth Amendment…
The comparative structural burden we face
here is every bit as troubling as those in
Hunter and Seattle because Proposal 2
creates the highest possible hurdle. This
comparative structural burden is most
apparent in tracing the channels for change
available to a citizen promoting any policy
unmodified by Proposal 2 and those
available
to
a
citizen
promoting
constitutionally permissible race-conscious
admissions policies.
An interested Michigan citizen may use any
number of avenues to change the admissions
policies on an issue outside the scope of
Proposal 2…
Because Proposal 2 entrenched the ban on
all race-conscious admissions policies at the
highest level, this last resort—the campaign
for a constitutional amendment—is the sole
recourse available to a Michigan citizen
who supports enacting such policies… Just
to place a proposed constitutional
amendment repealing Proposal 2 on the
ballot would require either the support of
two-thirds of both the Michigan House of
Representatives and Senate, or the
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signatures of a number of voters equivalent
to at least ten percent of the number of votes
cast for all candidates for governor in the
preceding general election. Once on the
ballot, the proposed amendment must then
earn the support of a majority of the voting
electorate to undo Proposal 2’s categorical
ban.
Only after traversing this difficult and costly
road would [a] citizen reach the starting
point of his neighbor who sought a legacyrelated admissions policy change. After [a]
successful
constitutional
amendment
campaign, [a] citizen could finally approach
the
university—by
petitioning
the
admissions
committees
or
higher
administrative authorities—to request the
adoption of race-conscious admissions
policies. By amending the Michigan
Constitution
to
prohibit
university
admissions units from using even modest
race-conscious admissions policies, Proposal
2 thus removed the authority to institute any
such policy from Michigan’s universities
and lodged it at the most remote level of
Michigan’s
government,
the
state
constitution. As with the unconstitutional
enactment in Hunter, proponents of raceconscious admissions policies now have to
obtain the approval of the Michigan
electorate and, if successful, admissions
units or other university powers—whereas
proponents
of
other
non-universal
admissions factors need only garner the
support of the latter.
The “simple but central principle” of Hunter
and Seattle is that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits requiring racial minorities

to surmount more formidable obstacles than
those faced by other groups to achieve their
political objectives… As the Supreme Court
has recognized, such special procedural
barriers to minority interests discriminate
against racial minorities just as surely as—
and more insidiously than—substantive
legal barriers challenged under the
traditional equal protection rubric. Because
less onerous avenues to effect political
change remain open to those advocating
consideration of nonracial factors in
admissions decisions, Michigan cannot force
those advocating for consideration of racial
factors to traverse a more arduous road
without
violating
the
Fourteenth
Amendment. We thus conclude that
Proposal 2 reorders the political process in
Michigan to place special burdens on
minority interests.
3. Objections to the Applicability of the
Hunter/Seattle Doctrine to Proposal 2
The Attorney General and the dissenters
make a number of arguments as to why
Proposal 2 survives constitutional scrutiny.
At the outset, it should be noted that
adopting these arguments as to Proposal 2’s
constitutionality would be particularly
ironic, given that these arguments applied
with equal force to Initiative 350 in Seattle.
While distinctions obviously exist between
the policy at issue here and that in Seattle,
the factual differences are not so material as
to justify departure from relevant Supreme
Court precedent.
a. Hunter/Seattle Doctrine and
Preferential Treatment Programs
The Attorney General and the dissenters
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assert that Hunter and Seattle are
inapplicable to Proposal 2 because those
cases only govern enactments that burden
racial minorities’ ability to obtain protection
from discrimination through the political
process, whereas Proposal 2 burdens racial
minorities’ ability to obtain preferential
treatment. At bottom, this is an argument
that an enactment violates the Equal
Protection Clause under Hunter and Seattle
only if the political process is distorted to
burden
legislation
providing
constitutionally-mandated protections, such
as anti-discrimination laws. Under this
theory, a state may require racial minorities
to endure a more burdensome process than
all other citizens when seeking to enact
policies that are in their favor if those
policies are constitutionally permissible but
not constitutionally required. This effort to
drive a wedge between the political-process
rights
afforded
when
seeking
antidiscrimination legislation and so-called
preferential treatment is fundamentally at
odds with Seattle.
The only way to find the Hunter/Seattle
doctrine inapplicable to the enactment of
preferential treatment is to adopt a strained
reading that ignores the preferential nature
of the legislation at issue in Seattle, and
inaccurately recast it as anti-discrimination
legislation…
The distinction urged by the Attorney
General and the dissenters [] erroneously
imposes an outcome-based limitation on a
process-based right. What matters is
whether racial minorities are forced to
surmount procedural hurdles in reaching

their objectives over which other groups do
not have to leap. If they are, the disparate
procedural treatment violates the Equal
Protection Clause, regardless of the
objective sought.
b. Proposal 2 as a Mere Repeal
Latching on to the Supreme Court’s
observation that “the simple repeal or
modification
of
desegregation
or
antidiscrimination laws, without more, never
has been viewed as embodying a
presumptively invalid racial classification,”
Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 539
(1982), the Attorney General implores us to
classify Proposal 2 as a mere repeal of the
universities’ race-conscious admissions
policies, rather than the kind of political
restructuring
that
implicates
the
Hunter/Seattle doctrine. Crawford, a case
decided the same day as Seattle, emphasizes
the difference between mere repeals and
political restructuring; state actors must
retain the power to repeal policies without
running afoul of the political-process
doctrine—certainly not every policy
elimination carries with it a political-process
violation. Crawford brings this difference
into focus, because the Court-approved
political action in that case (amendment of
the California Constitution) occurred at the
same level of government as the original
enactment (a prior amendment of the
California Constitution), thus leaving the
rules of the political game unchanged.
The Supreme Court has twice distinguished
the “mere repeal” at issue in Crawford from
the political reordering at issue in Hunter
and Seattle. The Crawford Court
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distinguished Hunter by clarifying that the
charter amendment in Hunter was
“something more than a mere repeal”
because it not only repealed an ordinance
adopted by the popularly elected City
Council, it removed from the Council the
power to reinstate it—more than just
undoing an unpopular act, the electorate in
Hunter had altered the framework of the
political process. The Seattle Court drew the
same distinction between the Washington
State legislation and the California
amendment…
Here, the rules are not the same after
Proposal 2. Rather than undoing an act of
popularly elected officials by simply
repealing the policies they created, Michigan
voters repealed the admissions policies that
university officials created and took the
additional step of permanently removing the
officials’ power to reinstate them. In short,
Proposal 2 “works something more than the
‘mere repeal’ of a desegregation law by the
political entity that created it.”…
More generally, the dissenting opinions
criticize our holding today in broad and
strident terms. At their core, these opinions
express disapproval of the political-process
doctrine itself, dissatisfaction that Grutter
allowed for even modest race-conscious
admissions policies, and incredulity at the
possibility that a state constitutional
amendment forbidding consideration of race
could violate the Equal Protection Clause.
But Hunter and Seattle have not been
overruled; Grutter continues to permit the
same holistic race-conscious admissions
policies Proposal 2 seeks to permanently

eliminate; and courts must decide equal
protection challenges by application of
precedent, rather than resort to syllogism.
Most importantly, our holding does not
place race-conscious admissions policies
beyond the political process. Opponents of
affirmative action remain free to advocate
for their preferred policies in the same
manner and at the same level of government
as its proponents.
4. Constitutionality of Proposal 2 Under
the Political–Process Doctrine
Proposal 2 modifies Michigan’s political
process “to place special burdens on the
ability of minority groups to achieve
beneficial legislation.” Because Proposal 2
fails the Hunter/ Seattle test, it must survive
strict scrutiny. Under the strict scrutiny
standard, the Attorney General must prove
that Proposal 2 is “necessary to further a
compelling state interest.” In Seattle, the
Court did not consider whether a compelling
state interest might justify a state’s
enactment of a racially-focused law that
restructures the political process, because
the government made no such argument.
Likewise, because the Attorney General
does not assert that Proposal 2 satisfies a
compelling state interest, we need not
consider this argument. Therefore, those
portions of Proposal 2 that affect Michigan’s
public institutions of higher education
violate the Equal Protection Clause.
5. Traditional Equal Protection Analysis
Having found that Proposal 2 deprives the
Plaintiffs of equal protection of the law
under the political-process doctrine, we need
not reach the question of whether it also
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violates the Equal Protection Clause when
assessed using the “traditional” analysis.
B. The University Defendants’ Non–
Dismissal
The University Defendants appeal the
district court’s denial of their motion to be
dismissed as misjoined parties under Rule
21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
We review the district court’s decision for
an abuse of discretion and must affirm
unless we are “left with a definite and firm
conviction that the trial court committed a
clear error of judgment.”
…Because a motion to be dismissed under

Rule 21 tracks Rule 20(a), we must ask
whether the Coalition Plaintiffs have
satisfied the rules for permissive joinder…
The district court concluded that the
University Defendants were properly joined
parties under Rule 20(a) because the
Coalition Plaintiffs asserted a request for
relief on a claim involving common issues
of law and fact. The district court found that
“the claims brought against the universities
are intertwined with those challenging
Proposal 2,” and “[i]f [the court] were to
find Proposal 2 unconstitutional, affirmative
action would not automatically be reinstated
into the admissions process. Rather, the
universities would have to choose to do so
on their own.” Because the Coalition
Plaintiffs’ traditional equal protection claim
could have required the University
Defendants to grant relief by reinstating
race-conscious admissions policies, the
district court found Rule 20(a) satisfied and
concluded that dismissal as a misjoined

party was not appropriate.
The discretionary language of Rule 21,
coupled with our deferential standard of
review, presents a high hurdle for reversal of
the district court’s determinations. The
Coalition Plaintiffs asserted a right to relief
against the University Defendants, and so
we are not “left with a definite and firm
conviction that the trial court committed a
clear error of judgment,” and affirm the
district court’s denial of the University
Defendants’ motion.
C. Dismissal of Russell as an Intervenor
Intervening Defendant Russell appeals the
district court’s decision granting the Cantrell
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment to
dismiss him from the case because he no
longer satisfied the requirements for
intervention. We review de novo a district
court’s grant of summary judgment…
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24(a), an interested party must meet four
requirements before being permitted to
intervene as of right: (1) his motion to
intervene must be timely; (2) he must have a
substantial legal interest in the subject
matter of the case; (3) he must demonstrate
that his interest will be impaired in the
absence of intervention; and (4) he must
demonstrate that the parties already before
the court do not adequately represent his
interest. An intervenor also must continue
to meet these requirements throughout the
duration of the litigation, as courts must be
able to ensure that parties have a live interest
in the case.
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Although Russell met all four requirements
when he was permitted to intervene, it has
become apparent during the course of
litigation that Russell can no longer
demonstrate that the parties already before
the court do not adequately represent his
interests… Russell’s intervention in this
litigation is no longer proper and we affirm
the district court’s grant of the Cantrell
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment to
dismiss him.
III.
Finding those provisions of Proposal 2
affecting Michigan’s public colleges and
universities unconstitutional, we REVERSE
the district court’s judgment granting the
Defendants–Appellees’ motion for summary
judgment. We further AFFIRM the district
court’s denial of the University Defendants’
motion to be dismissed as parties, and
AFFIRM the district court’s grant of the
Cantrell Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment as to Russell.
DANNY J. BOGGS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In 1848, the relevant local authority, the
Boston School Board, decided that race
should be used in making assignments in the
Boston public schools. They excluded and
segregated black students. However, in 1855
the ultimate political authority, the
legislature of Massachusetts, established the
general
principle
against
racial
discrimination in educational choices. The
legislature was lauded for that choice.
Over 100 years later, various Michigan local

and subordinate state authorities began to
implement policies of racial discrimination
in decisions on, inter alia, educational
admissions. The Supreme Court of the
United States held that such actions were
permissible, but certainly not that they were
compelled. Subsequently, the ultimate state
political authority, the People of Michigan,
voted to establish the same principle that
Massachusetts did in 1855…
The majority of the en banc court now holds
that this action of the People of Michigan
was unconstitutional, relying on an extreme
extension of two United States Supreme
Court cases ruling on very different
circumstances.
To begin with, those two cases each
involved a single action that transferred, for
the first time, decision making on a single
matter, a transfer held to be wholly aimed at
one disadvantaged race. In one instance,
approval of new anti-discrimination
ordinances was moved from the city council
to the voters of the city of Akron, and in the
other case, power over certain pupil
assignment policies was moved from the
citizens of one city in the state of
Washington to the citizens of the entire
state.
In our case, however, we have the citizens of
the entire state establishing a principle that
would in general have seemed laudable.
Even plaintiffs here do not allege, in the
context of their political-process argument,
that if this constitutional provision had been
enacted at some earlier time in Michigan, for
example upon its entry into the union, or
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upon the enactment of its new constitution
in 1963, that it would have been
unconstitutional. They instead contend that
because of current circumstances, and
intervening political decisions of racial
discrimination, these Supreme Court cases
make the principled action of the People of
Michigan unconstitutional.
Indeed, the majority seems to concede that
some set of decision makers in Michigan
would be able to reverse the policies that
they claim are immune from actions by the
entire body politic. Rather, they demand that
any changes in the educational (and perhaps
employment) policies here can be enacted
only by individual actions of each of the
university governing authorities (three of
which are chosen by statewide election over
eight years), each regional state university
(whose governing boards are appointed on a
staggered basis by the governor over eight
years), and each local educational authority
for community and technical schools (whose
governing authorities are chosen by a variety
of methods by each individual county and
locality)…
In addition, the situation in Michigan, in
which the various local authorities are
permitted (under Grutter) to engage in
varieties of racial discrimination, both for
and against variously defined groups, is
wholly at odds with the single-instance
restructuring of government involved in the
Supreme Court precedents relied on by the
majority.
Here, it was clear from the evidence in the
Grutter case, and in the record in this case,

discrimination may be practiced in favor of
certain racially or ethnically defined
minorities, primarily African–Americans (or
perhaps those deemed to be “black,”
whether or not actually “American”) or
“Hispanics” (although there was some
evidence that some groups generally defined
as “Hispanic” (especially Cuban) might be
discriminated against rather than in favor of.
On the other hand, various groups,
sometimes defined as racial minorities, may
be discriminated against.
Under these circumstances, holding it to be a
violation of equal protection for the ultimate
political authority to declare a uniform
policy of non-discrimination is vastly far
afield from the Supreme Court precedents…
I cannot agree that this decision is correct,
either as a matter of general constitutional
law or as an accurate interpretation of the
Supreme Court precedents. I therefore
respectfully DISSENT.
JULIA SMITH
Judge, dissenting.

GIBBONS,

Circuit

Proposal 2 is not unconstitutional under
either a political restructuring theory or
under traditional equal protection analysis. I
therefore respectfully dissent.
I.
Elementary principles of constitutional law
tell us that plaintiffs’ challenge to Proposal 2
should have little to no chance of success.
Plaintiffs argue that Michigan must retain its
racial and other preference policies in higher
education and that the state’s voters cannot
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make the contrary policy choice that factors
like race and gender may not be taken into
account in admissions. They make this
argument in the face of the core equal
protection principle of nondiscrimination—a
principle consistent with the choice of the
people of Michigan. They make the
argument despite the absence of any
precedent suggesting that states must
employ racial preferences in university
admissions. Essentially, the argument is one
of constitutional protection for racial and
gender preference—a concept at odds with
the basic meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause, as understood and explained through
decades of jurisprudence.
Although it has convinced a majority of this
court, plaintiffs’ argument must be
understood for the marked departure it
represents—for the first time, the
presumptively invalid policy of racial and
gender preference has been judicially
entrenched as beyond the political process.
In reaching its conclusion, the majority
strays from analysis bounded by familiar
principles of constitutional law and loses
sight of the parameters within which we
should operate in deciding this case. To be
accurate in characterizing the majority’s
approach, it relies on two Supreme Court
cases, which it deems highly instructive.
Yet, when examined carefully, these cases
have no application here, and, in
emphasizing them, the majority overlooks
recent case law providing more relevant
guidance.
II.

the majority relies does not invalidate
Proposal 2…
In holding that student-body diversity is a
compelling state interest that can justify the
narrowly tailored use of race in university
admissions policies, Grutter set forth three
principles about race-based admissions
policies that bear repeating here. First,
Grutter reminded us that “ ‘[a] core purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do
away with all governmentally imposed
discrimination based on race’ ” and that, as a
consequence, “race-conscious admissions
policies must be limited in time.” This
principle makes sense because all “racial
classifications are presumptively invalid....”
Second, Grutter indicated that the decision
to end race-conscious admissions policies is
primarily one to be made by states and their
public universities, not courts. And third,
while racially conscious admissions policies
are permitted, they are not constitutionally
required.
A.
With these core principles in mind we
examine the applicability of Hunter and
Seattle to the passage of Proposal 2 in
Michigan…
Because Hunter considered only the
political-process implications of repealing a
law that required equal treatment, it cannot
be read broadly to apply to the repeal of a
law requiring preferential treatment. As we
have observed, “[t]hese are fundamentally
different concepts.” Thus, Hunter does not
guide us here.

The political restructuring theory on which
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Nor does Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, suggest application of the political
restructuring doctrine to Proposal 2…
Accordingly, Proposal 2 is quite unlike the
narrow anti-busing measure struck down in
Seattle; it represents “a sea change in state
policy, of a kind not present in Seattle or any
other ‘political structure’ case.”
The majority is quick to conclude that
Proposal 2 and Initiative 350 each target
policies—affirmative action and integrative
busing,
respectively—that
“inure[
]
primarily to the benefit of the minority” and
therefore each has a “racial focus.” But in a
political-restructuring challenge, it is not
enough to observe that some of the policies
affected by the challenged enactment
primarily benefit minorities. Nor is it
enough to observe that, as here, the
challenged enactment was passed in
response to a high-profile case permitting
racially conscious admissions policies under
some circumstances. Though relevant, these
observations are alone insufficient: in a
political restructuring case, it is imperative
to consider the scope of the challenged
enactment itself. The majority fails to
account for the broad substantive reach of
Proposal 2 when compared to the narrow
focus of Initiative 350 and, in so doing,
improperly
stretches
the
political
restructuring doctrine that Seattle articulates
to the instant case…
B.
In
concluding
that
a
race-based
classification that is presumptively invalid,
but permissible under limited circumstances
and for a finite period of time, receives the

same structural protections against statewide
popular repeal as other laws that inure to the
interest of minorities, the majority walks
alone. The two highest courts to have
considered the question have concluded that
the political restructuring doctrine of Hunter
and Seattle does not prevent the statewide
popular
elimination
of
race-based
classification policies. …
[E]qual treatment is the baseline rule
embodied in the Equal Protection Clause,
from which racial-preference programs are a
departure. These programs—fundamentally
different from the underlying policies in
Hunter and Seattle—cannot receive special
sanctuary from a decision of the majority of
voters to return their law to the equal
protection norm of equal treatment.
III.
There is another reason that Hunter and
Seattle cannot forbid the amendment of the
Michigan Constitution through the passage
of Proposal 2. In both cases the relevant
lawmaking authority was reallocated from a
local legislative body to the “more complex
government structure,” of the city- or statewide general electorate, thereby placing a
“comparative structural burden ... on the
political
achievement
of
minority
interests.”…
As
the
record
here
demonstrates, the people of Michigan have
not restructured the state’s lawmaking
process in the manner prohibited by Hunter
and Seattle. Instead, their vote removed
admissions policy from the hands of
decisionmakers who were unelected and
unaccountable to either minority or majority
interests and placed it squarely in an
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electoral process in which all voters, both
minority and majority, have a voice.
A.
Public higher education in Michigan is
unique in that “[t]he Michigan Constitution
confers a unique constitutional status on
[Michigan’s] public universities and their
governing boards.” These boards are “the
highest form of juristic person known to the
law, a constitutional corporation of
independent authority, which, within the
scope of its functions, is coordinate with and
equal to that of the legislature.” …

In Seattle, the Court emphasized that the
type of action it found objectionable was the
creation of comparative burdens “on
minority participation in the political
process.” The Seattle majority, however,
did not view state university admissions
committees as a part of the “political
process” in the manner of an elected school
board or city council. A dialogue between
the majority and dissent in Seattle is
particularly instructive on this point. In
dissent, Justice Powell, critiquing the
potential breadth of the majority’s holding,
argued:

The governing boards have fully delegated
the
responsibility
for
establishing
admissions standards to several programspecific administrative units within each
institution, which set admissions criteria
through informal processes that can include
a faculty vote…

Thus, if the admissions committee of
a state law school developed an
affirmative-action plan that came
under fire, the Court apparently
would find it unconstitutional for any
higher authority to intervene unless
that authority traditionally dictated
admissions
policies.
As
a
constitutional matter, the dean of the
law school, the faculty of the
university system as a whole, the
university president, the chancellor
of the university, and the board of
regents might be powerless to
intervene despite their greater
authority under state law.

[T]he majority emphasizes that the boards—
although they have fully delegated their
decisionmaking power to admissions
directors and faculty—can revoke this
authority and can revise any bylaw in order
to effect changes in university admission
policies. …
B.
The decisionmaking structure at the
universities is important because these
program-specific
faculty
admissions
committees are far afield from the legislative
bodies from which lawmaking authority was
removed in Hunter and Seattle. To
appreciate this critical difference, we need
look no further than Seattle itself.

The majority, however, flatly dismissed this
concern as a misunderstanding of the court’s
decision: “It is evident, then, that the
horribles paraded by the dissent, which have
nothing to do with the ability of minorities to
participate in the process of selfgovernment—are entirely unrelated to this
case.”
For

the

Seattle

majority,

then,

an
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impermissible reordering of the political
process meant a reordering of the processes
through which the people exercise their right
to govern themselves.
Thus, the academic processes at work in
state university admissions in Michigan are
not “political processes” in the manner
contemplated in Seattle...
Of course, when an elected body delegates a
power, it does not automatically follow that
the delegatee’s decisions fall outside the
political process. But that is not the point.
…
Although the majority appears to see no
reason to distinguish between the unelected
and unresponsive program-specific faculty
admissions committees here and the
legislative bodies from which lawmaking
authority was removed in Hunter and
Seattle, a consideration of political
accountability in the political process is
squarely grounded in the Seattle opinion. In
Seattle, the Court undertook a close
examination of Washington’s system of
“establish[ing] the local school board, rather
than the State, as the entity charged with
making decisions of the type at issue,”:
But Washington has chosen to meet its
educational responsibilities primarily
through “state and local officials,
boards, and committees,” and the
responsibility to devise and tailor
educational programs to suit local needs
has emphatically been vested in the
local school boards.
Thus “each common school district
board
of
directors”
is
made
“accountable for the proper operation

of its district to the local community
and its electorate.” To this end, each
school board is “vested with the final
responsibility for the setting of policies
ensuring quality in the content and the
extent of its educational program.”
It was only upon its consideration of the
state statutory structure’s vesting of
decisionmaking in local and politically
accountable school boards that the Court
could conclude that “placing power over
desegregative busing at the state level ...
restructured the Washington political
process.” Taking this into account, it is
difficult to conclude that, in amending their
state constitution to prohibit the use of racial
preferences in university admissions, the
people of Michigan modified “the
community’s political mechanisms ... to
place effective decisionmaking authority
over a racial issue at another level of
government.”…
In short, Michigan has chosen to structure its
university system such that politics plays no
part in university admissions at all levels
within
its
constitutionally
created
universities. The Michigan voters have
therefore not restructured the political
process in their state by amending their state
constitution; they have merely employed it.
IV.
Finally, it is plain that Proposal 2 does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause under a
traditional approach to equal protection.
“The central purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the
prevention of official conduct discriminating
on the basis of race.” We apply strict
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scrutiny to laws that (1) include a facial
racial classification or (2) have a
discriminatory impact and a discriminatory
purpose. Proposal 2, which prohibits racial
classifications, a fortiori does not classify
facially on the basis of race. As to
discriminatory impact and purpose, the
district court did find “sufficient evidence to
establish a fact question on the disparate
impact part of the test” but found no
discriminatory purpose. Indeed, it stated that
“the demonstration of a discriminatory
purpose ... dooms [the] conventional equal
protection argument” because it “cannot [be]
sa[id] that the only purpose of Proposal 2 is
to discriminate against minorities.” The
district court’s conclusions are correct.
“[A]bsent a referendum that facially
discriminates racially, or one where
although facially neutral, the only possible
rationale is racially motivated, a district
court cannot inquire into the electorate’s
motivations in an equal protection clause
context.” Thus, no heightened level of
scrutiny need be applied to Proposal 2, and
under rational basis review, Proposal 2 is
easily justifiable. Proposal 2 does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause under the
conventional analysis. …
VI.
For these reasons, I would conclude that
Proposal 2 does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution under either a political
restructuring theory or traditional theory of
equal protection. Accordingly, I would
affirm the judgment of the district court.

[ROGERS, Circuit Judge, dissent omitted]

SUTTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I join Judge Gibbons’ dissent and write
separately to make a few additional points.
Today’s lawsuit transforms a potential virtue
of affirmative action into a vice. If there is
one feature of affirmative-action programs
that favors their constitutionality, it is that
they grow out of the democratic process: the
choice of a majority of a State’s residents to
create
race-conscious
admissions
preferences at their public universities not to
benefit a majority race but to facilitate the
educational opportunities of disadvantaged
racial minorities. Such democratically
enacted programs, like all democratically
enacted laws, deserve initial respect in the
courts, whether the particulars of a program
satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment.
Yet this lawsuit turns these assumptions on
their head. Democracy, it turns out, has
nothing to do with it. Plaintiffs insist that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of
“equal protection of the laws” imposes two
new rules on the policy debates surrounding
affirmative action in higher education. Rule
one: States not only may establish raceconscious affirmative-action programs, but
they must do so to comply with the
Fourteenth Amendment. Rule two: even if
the Fourteenth Amendment does not
mandate that States establish affirmativeaction programs at their public universities,
it bars them from eliminating such programs
through amendments to their constitutions.

114

A.
The first theory has little to recommend it,
so little that the notion of mandatory
affirmative action will come as a surprise to
all Justices of the United States Supreme
Court, past and present, who have labored to
determine whether state universities may
ever enact such race-conscious programs
under the United States Constitution…
Plaintiffs nonetheless insist that, “to the
extent that [Proposal 2] ... bar[s] race or
gender conscious programs that would be
permissible
under
the
Fourteenth
Amendment, it violates the Equal Protection
Clause.” Yet the words of the one
amendment (prohibiting the State from
“discriminat[ing] ... on the basis of race”)
cannot violate the words of the other (“nor
shall any State deny to any person ... the
equal protection of the laws”).
That is especially true in the context of
classifications based on race, which are
presumptively unconstitutional and which
must run the gauntlet of strict scrutiny to
survive. If racial preferences are only
occasionally and barely constitutional, it
cannot be the case that they are always
required. A State that wishes to treat citizens
of all races and nationalities equally “is free
as a matter of its own law” to do so. A first
premise for resolving this case is, and must
be, that a State does not deny equal
treatment by mandating it.
B.
The claimants’ other theory is of a piece.
Having argued that the people of Michigan

may not resort to the political process to
eliminate racial preferences because the
Fourteenth Amendment demands them, the
claimants alternatively insist that the
“political process doctrine” of the
Fourteenth Amendment separately prohibits
the State from eliminating such programs
already in existence by way of a state
constitutional amendment. That is not much
of an alternative, as it comes to the same
end. More fundamentally, the argument
misapprehends what States may do as a
matter of “politics” and “process.”…
By any reasonable measure, Proposal 2 does
not place “special burdens” on racial
minorities. It bans “discriminat[ing] against,
or grant[ing] preferential treatment to, any
individual or group on the basis of race, sex,
color, ethnicity, or national origin in the
operation of public employment, public
education, or public contracting.” That is not
a natural way to impose race-based burdens.
The words of the amendment place no
burden on anyone, and indeed are designed
to prohibit the State from burdening one
racial group relative to another. All of this
furthers the objectives of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the same seed from which the
political-process doctrine sprouted.
That the people of Michigan made this
change through their Constitution, as
opposed to state legislation or a new policy
embraced by the governing boards at the
three state universities, does not impose a
“special burden” on any racial minority.
There is nothing unusual about placing an
equal-protection
guarantee
in
a
constitution...
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I do not doubt that Proposal 2 places a
burden on proponents of affirmative action:
They no longer have access to it, and they
must amend the constitution to get it back.
But the Fourteenth Amendment insists only
that all participants in the debate have an
equal shot… It would be paradoxical if
something called the “political process
doctrine” insulated one side of a vigorous
policy debate from a timeless rule of
politics: win some, lose some…
Another oddity of this theory is that it would
apply even if the Michigan Constitution
eliminated affirmative-action programs in
another way. In 1963, the people of
Michigan passed an earlier amendment to
their Constitution, one that prohibited race
discrimination by governmental entities. In
view of this prohibition, a Michigan resident
surely would have the right to bring a claim
that the State Constitution’s existing
prohibition on race-based classifications
bars a system of racial preferences in
admissions, contracting and employment. If
there is one thing that the closely divided
decisions in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, Gratz and Grutter illustrate, it is that
the Michigan Supreme Court could
reasonably invalidate, or reasonably uphold,
racial preferences under the State
Constitution’s existing equal-protection
guarantee. A decision invalidating racial
preferences, however, would have precisely
the same effect as Proposal 2, establishing
that the Constitution bars racial preferences
and placing the onus on proponents of racial
preferences to alter the Constitution. The
claimants have no answer to this point. If

Proposal 2 violates the political-process
doctrine, so too would a decision by the
Michigan Supreme Court that comes to the
same
end
through
a
permissible
interpretation of the 1963 equal-protection
guarantee…
The Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans,
which did not concern racial classifications,
holds nothing to the contrary. Colorado
enacted a constitutional amendment
prohibiting the State and its municipalities
from enacting laws banning discrimination
on the basis of “homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships.”
In
invalidating
the
amendment, the Court noted that the
amendment “impos[es] a broad and
undifferentiated disability” (the inability to
seek protection from discrimination at the
state or local level) “on a single named
group” (gays and lesbians). The amendment
“was inexplicable by anything but animus
toward the class it affects” and therefore
“lack[ed] a rational relationship to legitimate
state interests.” By contrast, Proposal 2
serves a rational interest, indeed a
compelling
one:
eliminating
racial
classifications in admissions, public
employment and public contracting.
The Court’s decisions in Hunter and Seattle,
which did concern racial classifications, also
hold nothing to the contrary. The laws
invalidated in both cases were designed to
disadvantage one minority group—AfricanAmericans—and no other…
The same cannot be said of Proposal 2. In
the first place, Proposal 2 removes racial
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preferences,
not
anti-discrimination
measures. To the extent Proposal 2 has any
effect on the political structures through
which a group may acquire special treatment
in university admissions, it is a leveling
one… If ever there were a neutral, nonspecial burden, that is it. The Equal
Protection
Clause
freely
permits
governments to ban racial discrimination, as
here, but it does not freely permit them to
ban all bans on racial discrimination, as in
Hunter and Seattle.
In the second place, Proposal 2 prohibits
discrimination not just on the basis of race
but also on the basis of sex, ethnicity and
national origin. To the extent it
disadvantages anyone, it disadvantages
groups that together account for a majority
of Michigan’s population, not this or that
racial minority. It “make[s] little sense to
apply ‘political structure’ equal protection
principles where the group alleged to face
special political burdens itself constitutes a
majority of the electorate.”
Nor is it even clear which groups—men or
women, this racial group or that one—
Proposal 2 helps and hurts, or when each
group will be affected. Perhaps there was a
time when a ban on gender-based
preferences favored men…
It is no answer to say that Michigan may
adopt a statewide policy regarding racial
preferences if, and only if, they adopt
statewide policies on other admissions
policies—from how much weight to give
Advanced Placement courses to how many
zoology students to admit to how to treat

children of alumni to how to treat football
players, oboists or thespians. The Equal
Protection Clause reflects our collective
judgment that generalizations based on race
are dubious in the near term and destructive
in the long term, making it appropriate to
treat racial proxies, which are presumptively
unconstitutional, differently from other
more-pedestrian distinctions, which are
presumptively constitutional. It does not bar
Michigan from recognizing the same.
Any doubt that Hunter and Seattle support
rather than undermine the constitutionality
of Proposal 2 is removed by Seattle, the last
of the two decisions. In Seattle, Justice
Powell, no stranger to affirmative-action
debates, raised the concern that the
majority’s reasoning meant that, “if the
admissions committee of a state law school
developed an affirmative-action plan that
came under fire, the Court apparently would
find it unconstitutional for any higher
authority to intervene unless that authority
traditionally dictated admissions policies.”
No worries, the majority responded: The
problem with Washington’s anti-busing
initiative was “the burden it impose[d] on
minority participation in the political
process,” a consideration that made Justice
Powell’s hypothetical “entirely unrelated to
this case” because it had “nothing to do with
the ability of minorities to participate in the
process of self-government.” If the Court
thought that the removal of an affirmativeaction policy was “entirely unrelated” to the
concerns in Seattle, then I am hard-pressed
to understand why the same is not true in
this instance—and just as hard-pressed to
understand how anyone can insist our hands
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are tied in today’s case. The companion
political-process case to Seattle, handed
down the same day, confirmed the point.
The “Equal Protection Clause,” it made
clear, “is not violated by the mere repeal of
race-related legislation or policies that were
not required by the Federal Constitution in
the first place.” That is all that happened
here. The majority seeing it differently, I
respectfully dissent.
GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Today’s decision is the antithesis of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The
post-Civil
War
amendment that guarantees equal protection
to persons of all races has now been
construed as barring a state from prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race… I join
Judge Gibbons’ dissent, except for Section
III, and write separately to emphasize that
the “political structure” doctrine is an
anomaly incompatible with the Equal
Protection Clause. I urge the Supreme Court
to consign this misguided doctrine to the
annals of judicial history.
The Equal Protection Clause provides that
“[n]o State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.” Under its application, a state law
is subject to strict scrutiny when it explicitly
distinguishes between individuals on the
basis of race…
Facially neutral laws, on the other hand,
warrant strict scrutiny only if they are
“motivated by a racial purpose or object,”

The ill-advised “political structure” doctrine
employed by the majority in this case was
crafted by the Supreme Court more than one
hundred years after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Before today, the
cases fitting its mold numbered three:
Hunter v. Erickson,Washington v. Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1,and Lee v. Nyquist. The
infrequent use of the doctrine is not
surprising given its lack of a constitutional
basis. It replaces actual evidence of racial
motivation with a judicial presumption and,
hence, is an aberration inconsistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The laws at issue in Hunter and Seattle were
both facially neutral. Yet, in each case, the
Supreme Court held that strict scrutiny
applied without any need for the respective
plaintiffs to show that the laws were enacted
as a result of discriminatory intent or were
inexplicable on grounds other than race. It
simply declared that there was an “
‘explicitly racial classification’ ” where the
prior law inured to the benefit of racial
minorities, and the newly enacted law
moved the applicable decisionmaking
process to a more remote level of
government.
These decisions are justifiably characterized
as “jurisprudential enigmas that seem to lack
any coherent relationship to constitutional
doctrine as a whole.” “In the absence of a
federal constitutional violation requiring
race-specific remedies, a policy of strict
racial neutrality by a State ... violate[s] no
federal constitutional principle.”
Moreover, as first noted by Justice Powell,
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the
political
structure
doctrine
unconstitutionally suspends our normal and
necessary democratic process by prohibiting
change when a lower level of state
government has acted in a way that arguably
benefits racial minorities. …
Finally, in an effort to avoid confusion and
aid further review, I note the limits of the
majority’s holding. My colleagues do not
declare MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26
unconstitutional in its entirety. Rather, their
holding is limited to “racial minorities” and
our court’s declaration “[f]inding those
provisions of Proposal 2 affecting
Michigan’s public colleges and universities
unconstitutional....”
Thus,
the
other
provisions of MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26
that prohibit discrimination and preferential
treatment on the basis of sex, ethnicity, or
national origin in the operation of public
employment, public education, and public

contracting, survive this court’s ruling.
Further, the Michigan constitutional
prohibitions against discrimination or
preferential treatment based on race, except
in the operation of public colleges and
universities regarding “racial minorities,”
remain in effect. In this regard, art. I, § 26(7)
contains a severability clause: “Any
provision held invalid shall be severable
from the remaining portions of this section.”
I caution that because the term “racial
minorities” is not defined by the majority
opinion, the class of persons benefitting
from it is unclear and will be a potent source
of litigation were it allowed to stand. Under
today’s en banc decision, not all persons are
entitled to the equal protection of the laws.
For these reasons, I would affirm the district
court and therefore respectfully dissent.
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“Supreme Court Takes New Case on Affirmative Action, From Michigan”
New York Times
March 25, 2013
Adam Liptak
The Supreme Court on Monday added a new
affirmative action case to its docket. It
is already considering a major challenge to
the University of Texas’ race-conscious
admissions program.
The new case, Schuette v. Coalition to
Defend Affirmative Action, No. 12-682,
concerns a voter initiative in Michigan that
banned racial preferences in admissions to
the state’s public universities. In November,
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, in Cincinnati, ruled that the
initiative, which amended the State
Constitution,
violated
the
federal
Constitution’s equal protection clause.
The initiative, approved in 2006 by 58
percent of the state’s voters, prohibited
discrimination or preferential treatment in
public education, government contracting
and public employment. Groups favoring
affirmative action sued to block the part of
the law concerning higher education.
The appeals court majority said the problem
with the law was that it restructured the
state’s political process by making it harder
for disfavored minorities to press for
change.
“A student seeking to have her family’s
alumni connections considered in her
application to one of Michigan’s esteemed
public universities could do one of four
things to have the school adopt a legacy-

conscious admissions policy: she could
lobby the admissions committee, she could
petition the leadership of the university, she
could seek to influence the school’s
governing board, or, as a measure of last
resort, she could initiate a statewide
campaign to alter the state’s Constitution,”
Judge R. Guy Cole Jr. wrote for the
majority.
“The same cannot be said,” Judge Cole
added, “for a black student seeking the
adoption of a constitutionally permissible
race-conscious admissions policy. That
student could do only one thing to effect
change: she could attempt to amend the
Michigan Constitution — a lengthy,
expensive and arduous process — to repeal
the consequences of Proposal 2.”
A dissenting member of the court, Judge
Jeffrey S. Sutton, wrote that the majority
had it backward. “A state does not deny
equal treatment by mandating it,” he said.
The majority opinion, he added, “transforms
a potential virtue of affirmative action into a
vice.”
“If there is one feature of affirmative action
programs that favors their constitutionality,”
he said, “it is that they grow out of the
democratic process.”
In urging the Supreme Court to hear the
case, Bill Schuette, Michigan’s attorney
general, said the Sixth Circuit decision was
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“exceedingly odd” in saying, in essence, that
the government must engage in affirmative
action.
A brief filed by the American Civil Liberties
Union defended the decision.
“The vice of Proposal 2,” the brief said, “is
that it selectively shuts off access to the
ordinary political processes for advocates of
otherwise
permissible
race-conscious
policies.”
The decision the Supreme Court will review
was decided by an 8-to-7 vote. The eight
judges in the majority were all nominated by
Democratic presidents. The seven judges in
dissent were all nominated by Republican
presidents. (Judge Helene N. White, who

was in the majority, was initially nominated
by President Bill Clinton and was later
renominated by President George W. Bush
as part of a compromise involving several
nominations.)
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, in San Francisco, came to the
opposite conclusion in 1997, upholding the
state’s ban on racial preferences in higher
education and saying it “would be
paradoxical” to rule otherwise. The
court reaffirmed that ruling in 2010.
The case the Supreme Court agreed to hear
on Monday will be considered in the term
that starts in October. A decision in the
Texas case is expected shortly.
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“Affirmative Action in Texas and Michigan”
SCOTUSblog
May 1, 2013
Stephen Wermiel
When the Supreme Court agreed in February
2012 to hear the University of Texas
undergraduate admissions case, there was no
question that the appeal set up a major test
of affirmative action. But why, with that
case still lingering on the docket as the only
undecided case from the Court’s October
sitting, would the Justices agree to hear a
second affirmative action case, this one from
Michigan, to be argued next fall?
The short answer is that the two cases are
totally different.
Just how they differ and what the Court may
consider in each of the cases is worth
exploring. The answer may be of interest to
students of the Supreme Court and to those
interested in civil rights law and affirmative
action.
The Texas case, Fisher v. University of
Texas, is at this point the better known of the
two. The case is a challenge to an
affirmative action plan in which race is
taken into account as a factor for admission
to the University of Texas. Most of the
undergraduate places in the entering class
are filled through a plan which guarantees a
spot to any student who graduates in the top
ten percent of a Texas high school. But the
remaining slots – about nineteen percent of
the total spaces – are filled by a second
program that considers race among other
factors to promote diversity in the make-up

of
smaller
departments.

classes

and

academic

Abigail Fisher, who is Caucasian, applied
for admission to the university. But she was
not in the top ten percent of her class, and
she did not receive one of the remaining
slots. She then challenged her denial of
admission, arguing that she was a victim of
discrimination based on her race in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause. Both the federal district
court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit upheld the Texas plan.
In the Supreme Court, Fisher’s lawyer
disclaimed any interest in having the
Justices reverse their 2003 decision, Grutter
v. Bollinger, upholding the limited use of
affirmative action at the University of
Michigan Law School. Instead, he asked the
Court to strike down the university’s use of
race to fill the remaining slots and to clarify
that it goes beyond the very narrow
circumstances in which race may be taken
into account.
Ordinarily, if another affirmative action case
came along while the Texas appeal was
awaiting decision, the Justices would hold
the second case until they decide the first.
Then the Court would either grant the
second case, vacate the ruling, and send it
back to the lower court to apply the newly
announced rule or, perhaps, grant the second
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case if there are additional issues to be
addressed.
But the Court did neither of those things
with Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action, involving affirmative
action in Michigan. Instead, it granted the
petition for certiorari on March 25 without
waiting to decide Fisher first.
The reason
is
that Schuette presents
affirmative action issues in an entirely
different context. The case involves a
challenge to Proposal 2, an amendment to
the Michigan Constitution, approved by
voters in 2006, that banned affirmative
action in the state. The statewide ban was
challenged by a coalition of groups and
individuals who support the continued use of
affirmative action in Michigan. Other
lawsuits were filed as well, but a federal
district court largely upheld the ban enacted
by the voters.
The appeal roiled the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, where a three-judge
panel initially struck down the affirmative
action ban by a two-to-one vote. Then the
full Sixth Circuit agreed that Proposal 2 was
unconstitutional, ruling eight to seven in an
en banc decision that the voters had violated
the Equal Protection Clause. The ruling by
the full appeals court produced five separate
dissenting opinions. The Supreme Court
agreed to hear the appeal, and argument in
the case will be held next fall.
The two cases are, in a sense, mirror images
of one another. The Texas case asks whether
the use of affirmative action violates the
Equal Protection Clause. The Michigan

case, by contrast, asks whether the ban on
affirmative action violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
The Sixth Circuit ruled in the Michigan case
that because race-based affirmative action is
still permitted by the Constitution, a
decision by the voters of the state to prohibit
this remedy distorts the political process and
imposes a burden based on race that violates
the Equal Protection Clause. The ruling
turns not on the Court’s long line of
affirmative action cases but rather on a
shorter set of precedents holding that
individuals may not have their ability to
participate in and influence the political
process made more difficult because of their
race. The Sixth Circuit found that amending
the
state
constitution
made
it
unconstitutionally difficult to advocate for
the lawful remedy of affirmative action.
That the Texas and Michigan cases are
different is underscored in the legal
arguments. The Sixth Circuit opinion does
not cite the Fisher case at all. And the only
reference to Fisher in the Supreme Court
appeal of the Michigan case is in a footnote
in the petition by Michigan Attorney
General Bill Schuette which says, “This case
presents the different issue whether a state
has the right to accept this Court’s invitation
in Grutter to bring an end to all race-based
preferences.” The invitation is a reference to
the suggestion by former Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor in Grutter that affirmative action
should have an end point, perhaps twentyfive years after the 2003 Grutter decision.
Yet saying that the two cases are different
and do not rely on one another is a strangely
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unsatisfying answer. If the Supreme Court
were to virtually abolish affirmative action
inFisher, for example, that might seem to
obviate the need for a ruling in the Michigan
case.
At the same time, it also seems odd to think
that the Court may not say anything in the
Texas case that will have an impact on the
Michigan case. Of course, the fact that the
Court granted the Michigan case does not
preclude the Justices from saying something
in the Texas decision that is relevant to the
Michigan appeal.
What lies ahead in this volatile field is
uncertain, then. When the Court granted the
Michigan petition in March, there was

speculation that the Texas ruling must be
imminent or that the Court would dismiss
the Texas case for procedural reasons –
specifically, that Abigail Fisher has now
graduated from another university, although
she still seeks damages.
One thing the two cases share in common is
that Justice Elena Kagan is not participating
in either one, leaving an eight-Justice Court
to wrestle with the important issues. With
only eight participants and a Court closely
divided over issues of race, there are myriad
possibilities for how these cases might come
out. Stay tuned this spring for the Texas
ruling, and probably a year from now for
Michigan.
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“U.S. Court Takes Small Step to Bridge Ideological Divide”
Reuters
Joan Biskupic
June 25, 2013
It may never be clear what happened behind the
scenes at the U.S. Supreme Court to yield
Monday's compromise decision upholding
university affirmative action. The case was
heard in October, the first month of the term,
and as the months went by and the justices
deliberated in secret, the suspense grew.
Would this conservative-dominated court end
university affirmative action? Closely watching
were supporters who emphasized that education
remains a gateway to opportunity for longexcluded blacks and Hispanics, as well as critics
who said racial policies are unfair and no longer
required in multicultural America.
In the end, Monday's ruling was a modest one
that took the smallest of steps. Written by Justice
Anthony Kennedy, the 7-1 ruling permits
admissions officers to continue considering
applicants' race to ensure campus diversity. That
it took more than eight months - until the last
week of the term - suggests protracted
discussions and special care went in to garnering
the support of justices across the ideological
divide.
But even as the justices found common ground
in the University of Texas case, they ensured
that the last chapters of the national struggle
with race have yet to be written. They already
have a related racially charged case from
Michigan on the calendar for next term and the
legal standard voiced in Monday's decision
could eventually bring the Texas race-based
admissions policy back to the high court.
The role of the country's highest court in the
decades-long affirmative action saga has never

been easy and its series of tightly decided
rulings reflect the country's ambivalence.
For now, the court has left intact the scaffolding
of the historic 1978 opinion in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, which first
voiced the diversity rationale, and a 2003
decision, Grutter v. Bollinger, which vigorously
affirmed the value of diversity. Both of those
cases were decided on 5-4 votes.
The justices cast some doubt on the University
of Texas' racial admissions, however, by saying
that lower court judges had too generously
deferred to university officials. Monday's ruling
ordered the lower appeals court to reconsider its
stance upholding the admissions.
CONSERVATIVES,
TOGETHER

LIBERALS

JOIN

The opinion was joined by Chief Justice John
Roberts and three other conservative justices
who have criticized racial remedies, and by two
liberals, including Justice Sonia Sotomayor, a
Latina who attended Princeton and Yale law
school on affirmative action and has touted the
value of such programs.
But tensions plainly linger. Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, the only justice to dissent from the
decision ordering a tougher lower-court review
of the Texas program, read portions of her
opinion from the bench on Monday. She said the
majority should have simply upheld the Texas
policy. Addressing broadly the value of racial
policies, Ginsburg, the senior liberal on the
bench, said, "State universities need not blind
themselves to the still lingering, every day
evident, effects of centuries of law-sanctioned
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inequality."
Among the spectators in the white marble
courtroom was Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
whose 2003 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger was
at stake - and remained largely preserved for
now. The retired 83-year-old justice sat with her
hands clasped on her lap while Kennedy
outlined the majority opinion.
When O'Connor penned her decision in the 2003
case from the University of Michigan, the
majority expected the decision to hold for about
25 years, "when the use of racial preferences
will no longer be necessary to further the interest
approved today."
Advocates on both sides thought the end might
come sooner than the O'Connor majority had
supposed, given the interests of the Roberts
court.
Abigail Fisher, a white suburban Houston
student, began Monday's lawsuit, claiming she
was wrongly rejected by the university when
minorities with similar test scores and grades
were admitted. The current majority took the
Texas case though university officials said the
case was procedurally flawed because Fisher
decided to go to Louisiana State University,
from which she graduated last year.
The challenged program that considers
applicants' race supplements a Texas policy
guaranteeing admission to the Austin flagship
campus for high school graduates scoring in the
top 10 percent of their individual schools.
Administrators contended the 10 percent
program did not make the university sufficiently
diverse.
DIVERSITY VALUED
The ideological makeup of the court suggested it
might be ready to roll back affirmative action.
Justice Kennedy had dissented from the 2003

University of Michigan dispute, and O'Connor
was succeeded by Justice Samuel Alito, far more
conservative on racial policies and the U.S.
Constitution's equality guarantee.
But, on this go-round, both accepted the 2003
decision.
"The attainment of a diverse student body,"
Kennedy wrote, "serves values beyond race
alone, including enhanced classroom dialogue
and the lessening of racial isolation and
stereotypes."
Liberal justices Sotomayor and Stephen Breyer
were ready to sign on, possibly enticed by
Kennedy's acceptance of the basic framework of
the 2003 Grutter decision. The court's fourth
liberal, Elena Kagan, did not participate because
of her involvement in the dispute as U.S.
solicitor general before she joined the bench in
2010.
In the term that begins next October, the justices
will hear a case testing the constitutionality of a
statewide ban on race-based affirmative action
in public education, employment and
contracting. Michigan voters adopted the
prohibition in 2006. A Supreme Court decision
that upholds it could embolden affirmative
action opponents. But such a decision would
affect only Michigan and the few other states
that have such bans.
A broader decision that affects campuses
nationwide would have to come in another case.
For now, university policies aimed at racial
diversity remain constitutional. Said University
of Virginia law professor John Jeffries,
biographer of Justice Lewis Powell who was the
author of Bakke, said of Monday's decision, "It
leaves the Powell position (for) diversity ...
alive, with a chance to fight again another day."
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“6th Circuit: Proposal 2 Unconstitutional”
The Michigan Daily
November 15, 2012
Rayza Goldsmith
The court issued an 8-7 decision to overturn
a state ballot initiative — commonly known
as Proposal 2, which was voted into law in
2006 — that banned the use of “preferential
treatment” in state decisions regarding
university admissions or employment on the
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity or national
origin.
The ruling was made by all 15 judges on the
6th Circuit Court of Appeals, at the request
of Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette,
a defendant in the case. A three-judge panel
of the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals made an
initial ruling against Proposal 2 in July 2011.
The majority ruled that the ban on the basis
of race is a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and therefore unconstitutional.
The decision overturns a previous decision
made by the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit,
which ruled Proposal 2 to be constitutional.
The majority opinion was based on two
primary arguments, rested on the argument
that admissions decisions can be considered
a part of the political process. Judge R. Guy
Cole Jr. wrote for the majority, arguing that
Proposal 2 is unconstitutional based on the
fact that it primarily harms minorities by
reordering the political process and placing
undue burden on them.

“Because less onerous avenues to effect
political change remain open to those
advocating consideration of non-racial
factors in admissions decisions, Michigan
cannot force those advocating for
consideration of racial factors to traverse a
more arduous road without violating the
Fourteenth Amendment,” Cole wrote. “We
thus conclude that Proposal 2 reorders the
political process in Michigan to place
special burdens on minority interests.”
Law Prof. Mark Rosenbaum, who helped
argue the case on behalf of the plaintiffs,
said he was overwhelmed by the decision
and excited about its implications.
“It’s a landmark civil rights issue,”
Rosenbaum said. “It is not about the
constitutionality of affirmative action; it is a
bigger story than that. It’s about access to
the political process. It is about whether or
not a popular initiative can cut minorities —
people of color — out of the political
process.”
Rosenbaum said even if the defendants,
including Schuette, appeal the decision, the
ruling will take immediate effect, meaning
the University could choose to use race as a
factor in admissions decisions.
In a statement, Schuette said he intends to
appeal the decision to the U.S. Supreme
Court on the basis that the Michigan Civil
Rights Initiative — the amended section of
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the constitution that effectively banned
affirmative action — is not only
constitutional, but also approved by a
majority of Michigan voters.
“MCRI embodies the fundamental premise
of what America is all about: equal
opportunity under the law,” Schuette said.
“Entrance to our great universities must be
based upon merit. We are prepared to take
the fight for quality, fairness and the rule of
law to the U.S. Supreme Court.”
In order to have the case heard at the
Supreme Court level, Schuette must file a
petition of certiorari within 90 days of
Thursday’s decision.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Danny
Boggs drew on the fact that Proposal 2 was
enacted by voters to make his case.
“We have the citizens of the entire state
establishing a principle that would, in
general, have seemed laudable,” Boggs
wrote.
Boggs also wrote in the dissent that the
majority’s case was a stretch and relied on
tenuous precedent.
He responded to the majority’s assertion that
admissions decisions fall within the jurisdiction
of political processes, contending that such an
argument does not have historical backing and
that Proposal 2 is inherently not discriminatory.

“Under these circumstances, holding it to be
a violation of equal protection for the
ultimate political authority to declare a
uniform policy of non-discrimination is
vastly far afield from the Supreme Court
precedents,” Boggs wrote.

In a statement, University spokesman Rick
Fitzgerald said the University is reviewing
the decision, but because there are multiple
lengthy opinions, it could take some time to
fully understand the ruling's implications.
George Washington, an attorney for By Any
Means Necessary — a pro-affirmative
action group that helped argue the case
before the court — said he would like to see
a turnaround from the drop in minority
enrollment as a result of the decision.
“It is a tremendous victory for black and
Latino students and for the movement that
fought for affirmative action for many
years,” Washington said. “It means that
thousands of black, Latino and Native
American students who would not have the
chance to go to our most selective colleges
will now have that chance.”
Residential College Prof. Carl Cohen, a
leading proponent of Michigan’s Proposal 2,
said the majority opinion is incorrect in its
assertion that Proposal 2 violates the Equal
Protection Clause because it places an undue
burden on those who seek preference,
adding that the opinion is based on
ludicrous, circuitous logic.
“The argument upon which the 6th Circuit
Court of Appeals based its reversal is
absolutely unbelievable,” Cohen said.
“That's
really
acrobatic,
that
the
constitutional amendment that says you may
not
give
preferences
violates
the
constitutional amendment that says you may
not give preference.”
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“Supreme Court is Urged to Reject Michigan Affirmative Action Ban”
Los Angeles Times
David Savage
August 30, 2013
California Atty. Gen. Kamala Harris urged the
Supreme Court on Friday to strike down a
Michigan voter initiative that bans "preferential
treatment" based on race in its state colleges and
universities, a ruling that would likely invalidate
a similar ban approved by California's voters in
1996.

individual or group on the basis of race, sex,
college, ethnicity or national origin."

These bans on affirmative action "violate the
Equal Protection Clause" of the Constitution,
Harris said, by "erecting barriers to the adoption
of race-conscious admissions policies."

Lawyers challenging the measure say that
because it became part of the state constitution,
they were deprived of the equal chance to lobby
for affirmative-action policies in the state
Legislature or before university officials. They
say they want a Supreme Court ruling that
would also wipe out the nearly identical voterapproved bans in California, Arizona,
Washington, Nebraska and Oklahoma.

For a second term in a row, the high court is set
to consider a major test of affirmative action in
state universities. In June, the court revived a
white student's challenge to a race-based
admissions policy at the University of Texas. In
October, the court will consider a constitutional
challenge that comes from the opposite
direction. Lawyers representing black and other
minority students are contesting Michigan's ban
on affirmative action.

In November, they won an 8-7 ruling by the
Cincinnati-based 6th Circuit Court of Appeals,
which declared unconstitutional Michigan's
Proposition 2. It "undermines the Equal
Protection Clause's guarantee that all citizens
ought to have equal access to the tools of
political change," said Judge R. Guy Cole Jr. His
opinion spoke for all eight Democratic
appointees to the appeals court, while the seven
Republican appointees dissented.

Separately, the University of California's
president and 10 chancellors filed their own
brief Friday highlighting the ban on affirmative
action. "More than 15 years after Proposition
209 barred consideration of race in admissions
decisions … the University of California still
struggles to enroll a student body that
encompasses the broad racial diversity of the
state," they said.

Michigan Atty. Gen. Bill Schuette appealed, and
the court will hear arguments in the case of
Schuette vs. Coalition to Defend Affirmative
Action on Oct. 15.

In 2006, Michigan's voters approved Proposition
2, 58% to 42%. Using the words of the
California measure, the ban said Michigan's
public universities "shall not discriminate
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any

Harris' brief for California was also signed by
Lisa Madigan of Illinois and four other attorneys
general, though none have similar voter
measures that turn on the outcome. Usually, a
state's top attorneys intervene in pending
Supreme Court cases to defend their state's laws.
In this instance, however, the California attorney
general is asking the justices to hand down a
ruling that would void a provision in California's
Constitution.
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Last year, Harris also refused to defend
California's Proposition 8 and its prohibition on
same-sex marriage after it had been struck down
by a judge in San Francisco. The Supreme Court
in June, citing the state's refusal, said the private
sponsors of the ballot measure did not have legal
standing to defend it in court.
Harris took office as attorney general in January
2011. Her website describes her as "the first
woman, the first African American and the first
South Asian to hold the office in the history of
California."
Her friend-of-the-court brief read: "California
has a particular interest in the outcome of this
case because, as in Michigan, its voters amended
its Constitution to add language virtually
identical to the constitutional provision at issue

in this case.... It is particularly important for
states with large nonwhite populations to ensure
that students of all races have meaningful access
to their public colleges and universities."
She lauded the "well-reasoned decision" of the
6th Circuit and said the students and citizens
should be free to press for "race-conscious
admissions policies."
Harris' brief for California was also signed by
the top attorneys from five other states and the
District of Columbia: Madigan of Illinois, David
Louie of Hawaii, Thomas Miller of Iowa, Gary
King of New Mexico, Ellen Rosenbaum of
Oregon and Irvin Nathan from Washington,
D.C.
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“What’s Your Hurry?”
The New York Times
Linda Greenhouse
June 12, 2013
Every Supreme Court decision day that goes
by without a ruling in the University of
Texas affirmative action case provokes a
generalized wringing of hands from those
eager (or afraid) to learn the constitutional
future of university admissions. “Where’s
the case? What’s taking so long?”
To which I say: what’s the rush?
True, Fisher v. University of Texas was
argued way back on Oct. 10, making it the
oldest argued case on the court’s docket by
more than six weeks. True, cases argued as
recently as late April have already been
decided, and it’s rare for June to arrive with
an October case still hanging.
So I’m as puzzled as the next person as to
precisely why the eight justices participating
in this case (Justice Elena Kagan is recused,
due to her earlier work on the case as
solicitor general) haven’t been able to
produce a decision. But that’s not really my
point.
Rather, I’m questioning why the justices set
out to decide this case in the first place. Why
were they eager to get their hands around the
issue so soon after suggesting, in the 2003
decision that upheld race-conscious
admission in the University of Michigan
Law School, that the country and the court
should let the matter rest for 25 years? Why
would they pick a case destined to be

decided by an eight-member court, a case
afflicted with a major procedural obstacle —
the disappointed white applicant has already
received her college degree elsewhere, a fact
that would seem to make the case moot, as
an earlier, more restrained Supreme Court
found 40 years ago when confronted with a
similar situation in an affirmative action
case it had undertaken to decide.
This is a
court in a hurry. The justices made that
strikingly clear back in March, when they
accepted a case on the validity of a voter
referendum in Michigan that barred
affirmative action in public university
admissions. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had declared
the ban unconstitutional by a vote of 8 to 7.
By the time the Supreme Court agreed on
March 25 to hear the Michigan attorney
general’s appeal, its calendar for the current
term was full, so the case won’t be argued
until after the new term begins in the fall.
The new case, Schuette v. Coalition to
Defend Affirmative Action, differs from the
Texas case in presenting an oblique rather
than direct attack on affirmative action. The
question is whether by adding the antiaffirmative action provision to the state
constitution, the referendum altered the
political process in a way that violates the
federal constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. This “political process” question,
which the court has wrestled with for years,
won’t be answered by what the court does in
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the Texas case. But it’s hard to imagine that
the Texas decision won’t provide the lens
through which to examine the issue in the
Michigan case.
When the justices receive a new appeal that
raises questions in the general vicinity of a
case they have already agreed to decide,
their routine response is to place the new
case on hold to see how things shake out. It
was therefore surprising that rather than
deferring action on the Michigan case, the
court grabbed it.
One reason might be that Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy, who almost certainly received
the opinion assignment in the Texas case,
isn’t going far enough in that case to satisfy
the other conservative justices. Under this
theory, those justices responded to what they
saw as a frustratingly narrow Kennedy
opinion by jumping aboard the Michigan
case as the next potential vehicle for
shutting down affirmative action. They
might have waited — traditionally, they
would have waited — but, as I said, it’s a
court in a hurry.
The question is why. The answer, I believe,
can be found in the faint but resonant
drumbeat of conservative concern about the
stability of the Roberts Court’s narrow
conservative majority. Most uninformed
commentary on the future of the Supreme
Court — which is to say, most commentary
— has focused on Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, who just passed her 80th birthday.
Is she about to retire, everyone asks, to
permit President Obama to name her
replacement? (The answer is no, she’s
healthy and loves her job.)

This near-obsession with Justice Ginsburg’s
age, health and plans has obscured the fact
that the conservative justices are growing
old at exactly the same rate. Justice Antonin
Scalia turned 77 in March. Justice Kennedy
turns 77 next month. Even Justice Clarence
Thomas, a mere 43 when he was named to
the court 22 years ago, becomes eligible on
June 23 for his Medicare card.
Curt Levey, a prominent conservative
commentator, took the occasion of Justice
Scalia’s birthday to observe, in a Fox News
op-ed, that it was entirely likely that at least
one of the five conservative justices would
leave the bench during the remainder of the
Obama presidency. The result, he warned
apocalyptically, was “a Warren Court
redux,” one that would erase “all the strides
conservatives have made since the Reagan
era in containing judicial activism.”
Mr. Levey, a Harvard Law School graduate,
heads an organization called the Committee
for Justice, devoted to blocking Obama
administration judicial nominations. His
account of exactly what the court under
Chief Justice Earl Warren can be blamed for
left a bit to be desired. “The Warren Court
brought us Roe v. Wade,” he asserted. In
fact, it was the Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger that issued the
1973 abortion decision, with a 7-to-2
majority opinion joined by three of President
Richard M. Nixon’s four appointees,
including the chief justice.
Well, the details matter less, anyway, than
the overall theme, which is: be afraid, be
very afraid. Or to put it another way, in the
words of the old Janis Joplin song: get it
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while you can. This is as good as it’s going
to get.
That impulse may also explain the court’s
otherwise mysterious decision a few weeks
ago to grant review in a new church-state
case, Town of Greece v. Galloway. The
western New York town is appealing a
federal appeals court’s decision that its
practice of opening town board meetings
with a prayer violates the Establishment
Clause.
The problem that the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit found was
not the notion of prayer as such (the
Supreme Court upheld the concept of
legislative prayer 30 years ago but the fact
that nearly all the prayers offered at the
board meetings were Christian, with most
containing explicit references to Jesus
and/or Christian theology. That pattern, the
appeals court said, meant that “the town’s

prayer practice must be viewed as an
endorsement of a particular religious
viewpoint.” Other federal courts confronted
with similar facts have ruled the same way.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has been
able to find near-unanimity in religion cases
only by deciding the cases on the narrowest
possible grounds. So what would motivate
the justices to reach for this little case, with
its facts that are surely inauspicious for
those who want to elevate the role of
religion in the public square? I suppose the
answer is: there’s nothing to lose, and if we
don’t go for it now, it may only get harder in
the years ahead.
Get it while you can — or even if you can’t.
We’ll see soon enough.
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Madigan v. Levin
12-872
Ruling Below: Levin v. Madigan, 692 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2012), cert granted, 133 S.Ct. 1600
(2013).
Harvey N. Levin worked as an Illinois Assistant Attorney General from September 5, 2000, until
his termination on May 12, 2006. Levin was over the age of sixty at the time of his termination
and believes he was fired because of his age and gender. Levin filed suit against the State of
Illinois, the Office of the Illinois Attorney General, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan, in
her individual and official capacities, and four additional Attorney General employees in their
individual capacities. He asserts claims for relief under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The individual-capacity
defendants argued at the district court that they were entitled to qualified immunity with respect
to Levin's § 1983 age discrimination claim. Specifically, they argued that Levin's § 1983 claim is
precluded by the ADEA because the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for age discrimination
claims. The district court disagreed and denied qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that the court had jurisdiction to decide whether the ADEA precluded a §
1983 equal protection claim; resolving a matter of first impression in the Circuit, the ADEA does
not preclude a § 1983 claim for enforcement of constitutional rights; and individual defendants
were not entitled to qualified immunity.
Question Presented: Whether the Seventh Circuit erred in holding, in an acknowledged
departure from the rule in at least four other circuits, that state and local government employees
may avoid the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act’s comprehensive remedial regime
by bringing age discrimination claims directly under the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.

Harvey N. LEVIN, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Lisa MADIGAN, in her individual capacity, Ann Spillane, Alan Rosen, Roger Flahaven,
and Deborah Hagan, Defendants–Appellants,
and
Lisa Madigan, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Illinois, Office of the Illinois
Attorney General, and State of Illinois, Defendants.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
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Decided on August 17, 2012
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
KANNE, Circuit Judge
Harvey N. Levin worked as an Illinois
Assistant Attorney General from September
5, 2000, until his termination on May 12,
2006. Levin was over the age of sixty at the
time of his termination and believes he was
fired because of his age and gender.
Accordingly, Levin filed suit against the
State of Illinois, the Office of the Illinois
Attorney General, Illinois Attorney General
Lisa Madigan, in her individual and official
capacities, and four additional Attorney
General employees in their individual
capacities. He asserts claims for relief under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. §
1983. The individual-capacity defendants
argued at the district court that they were
entitled to qualified immunity with respect
to Levin's § 1983 age discrimination claim.
Specifically, they argued that Levin's §
1983 claim is precluded by the ADEA
because the ADEA is the exclusive remedy
for age discrimination claims. The district
court disagreed and denied qualified
immunity. The case is now before us on
interlocutory appeal, and for the following
reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
I. BACKGROUND
Levin was fifty-five years old when he was
hired as an Assistant Attorney General in the
Office of the Illinois Attorney General's

Consumer Fraud Bureau on September 5,
2000. On December 1, 2002, Levin was
promoted to Senior Assistant Attorney
General and retained this title until he was
terminated on May 12, 2006. Levin was
evaluated on an annual basis and his
performance reviews indicate that he
consistently met or exceeded his employer's
expectations in twelve job categories. The
Illinois Attorney General's Office asserts,
however, that Levin's low productivity,
excessive socializing, inferior litigation
skills, and poor judgment led to his
termination. Although not addressed in
Levin's evaluations, these issues were
discussed among Levin's supervisors and
brought to Levin's attention.
Levin was one of twelve attorneys fired in
May 2006. After he was terminated, Levin
was replaced by a female attorney in her
thirties. Two other male attorneys from the
Consumer Fraud Bureau, both over the age
of forty, were also terminated and replaced
by younger attorneys, one male and one
female. The Illinois Attorney General's
Office disputes that these new hires
“replaced” the terminated attorneys because
the younger attorneys were not assigned the
three former attorneys' cases.
Levin filed his complaint in the Northern
District of Illinois on August 23, 2007,
asserting claims of age and sex
discrimination under the ADEA, Title VII,
and the Equal Protection Clause via 42

135

U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants in this suit
are divided into two groups for litigation
purposes: (1) Lisa Madigan, in her official
capacity as the Illinois Attorney General, the
Office of the Illinois Attorney General, and
the State of Illinois (the “Entity
Defendants”), and (2) Lisa Madigan as an
individual, Ann Spillane, Alan Rosen, Roger
Flahavan, and Deborah Hagan (the
“Individual
Defendants”).
Only
the
Individual Defendants have appealed to this
court.
On November 26, 2007, the Entity
Defendants and the Individual Defendants
filed separate motions to dismiss Levin's
complaint in its entirety. On December 12,
2007, the district court stayed discovery,
requiring Levin to respond to the Entity
Defendants's motion as to whether he was an
“employee” for purposes of the ADEA and
Title VII. On September 12, 2008, the
district court held that Levin was an
“employee” and lifted the stay on discovery.
The Entity Defendants filed a second motion
to dismiss shortly thereafter. Following
discovery, the Entity Defendants and the
Individual Defendants filed separate motions
for summary judgment on November 13,
2009.
The district court ruled on the five pending
motions in two separate opinions, both of
which are pertinent to the issues before this
court. In the first opinion, decided March 10,
2010, the Honorable David H. Coar
addressed the three pending motions to
dismiss. Levin I. Relevant to this appeal,
Judge Coar granted the Individual
Defendants' motion to dismiss Levin's §
1983 equal protection claim for age

discrimination. In
that
motion,
the
Individual Defendants asserted that the §
1983 claim was either precluded by the
ADEA or they were entitled to qualified
immunity. After acknowledging that the
Seventh Circuit has yet to address ADEA
exclusivity, Judge Coar held that the ADEA
does not foreclose Levin's § 1983 equal
protection claim. But Judge Coar granted
qualified immunity for the Individual
Defendants because the availability of such
a claim was not clearly established at the
time Levin was terminated.
On January 7, 2011, Levin's case was
reassigned to the Honorable Edmond E.
Chang. Judge Chang issued an opinion on
July 12, 2011, granting in part and denying
in part the two pending motions for
summary judgment. Levin II. Judge Chang
did not disturb Judge Coar's ruling that the
ADEA is not the exclusive remedy for age
discrimination claims. He did, however,
reverse two of Judge Coar's prior rulings, in
light of additional briefing. First, Judge
Chang determined that Levin is not an
“employee” for purposes of Title VII and
the ADEA, thus foreclosing any claim Levin
could bring under those statutes. Second,
Judge Chang held that the Individual
Defendants were not entitled to qualified
immunity on Levin's § 1983 claim for age
discrimination. Rejecting Judge Coar's
reasoning, Judge Chang noted that “[w]hen
determining whether qualified immunity
applies to protect a defendant, the question
is whether a reasonable official would have
known that the official was violating a
clearly established constitutional right,
which is a substantive question, not a
question concerning whether a particular
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procedural vehicle (i.e., cause of action) is
available.” Because it is clearly established
that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
arbitrary age discrimination, Judge Chang
held that qualified immunity did not apply
and Levin had established a genuine issue of
material fact such that his § 1983 age
discrimination claim could proceed to
trial. The Individual Defendants filed this
timely appeal, asking this court to find that
they are entitled to qualified immunity
because the ADEA is the exclusive remedy
for Levin's age discrimination claims.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
Levin does not dispute that we have
jurisdiction over an order denying qualified
immunity
under
the
collateral
order doctrine. But Levin believes this court
lacks jurisdiction over the issue of whether
the ADEA precludes a § 1983 equal
protection claim. Levin asserts that this
issue, resolved in Judge Coar's opinion, is
not inextricably intertwined with Judge
Chang's denial of qualified immunity.
We disagree with Levin's analysis. Instead,
we believe this case is analogous to Wilkie v.
Robbins. In Wilkie, on an interlocutory
appeal of the denial of qualified immunity,
the Supreme Court considered whether a
new, freestanding damages remedy should
exist under Bivens. The Supreme Court held
that it had jurisdiction to consider whether
such a remedy existed because the
recognition of an entire cause of action is
“directly implicated by the defense of
qualified immunity.” Similar to Wilkie, the
very existence of a freestanding damages

remedy under § 1983 is directly implicated
by a qualified immunity defense such that
we have jurisdiction over this appeal. Thus,
we first consider whether the ADEA
precludes a § 1983 equal protection claim
before we turn to the issue of qualified
immunity.
B. General Preclusion of § 1983 Claims
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “authorizes
suits to enforce individual rights under
federal statutes as well as the Constitution”
against state and local government
officials. Section 1983 does not create
substantive rights, but operates as “a means
for vindicating federal rights conferred
elsewhere.”
In evaluating the limits of relief available
under § 1983 for statutory claims, the
Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen the
remedial devices provided in a particular
Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they
may suffice to demonstrate congressional
intent to preclude the remedy of suits
under § 1983.” In Sea Clammers, the
Supreme Court held that a suit for damages
under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (“FWPCA”) or Marine Protection,
Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972
(“MPRSA”) could not be brought pursuant
to § 1983because both Acts “provide quite
comprehensive
enforcement
mechanisms.” These mechanisms include
citizen-suit provisions, which allow private
citizens to sue for prospective relief, and
notice provisions requiring such plaintiffs to
notify the EPA, the State, and the alleged
violator before filing suit.
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Over two decades after Sea Clammers, the
Supreme Court again rejected a plaintiff's
attempt to seek damages under § 1983 for
violation of a statute which provided its
own,
more
restrictive
judicial
remedy. In Rancho Palos Verdes, the
plaintiff filed suit for injunctive relief under
the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(“TCA”) and sought damages and attorney's
fees under § 1983 after a city planning
committee denied his request for a
conditional-use permit for an antenna tower
on his property. The TCA “imposes specific
limitations on the traditional authority of
state and local governments to regulate the
location, construction, and modification of
[wireless
communications]
facilities.” When a permit is requested and
denied, the TCA requires local governments
to provide a written decision, supported by
substantial evidence, within a reasonable
period of time. An individual may seek
judicial review within thirty days of this
decision, and the court is required to hear
and decide the case on an expedited
basis. Further, a plaintiff may not be entitled
to compensatory damages and cannot
recover attorney's fees and costs.
In discerning congressional intent, the Court
held that “[t]he provision of an express,
private means of redress in the statute itself
is ordinarily an indication that Congress did
not intend to leave open a more expansive
remedy under § 1983.” Conversely, the
Court noted that “in all of the cases in which
we have held that § 1983 is available for
violation of a federal statute, we have
emphasized that the statute at issue ... did
not provide a private judicial remedy ... for
the rights violated.” Because the TCA's

provisions limit the relief available to
private individuals and provide for
expedited judicial review, the Court held
that the TCA precludes relief under § 1983.
While
the
plaintiffs
in Sea
Clammers and Rancho Palos Verdes sought
to assert federal statutory rights under §
1983, two other Supreme Court cases have
examined whether a plaintiff is precluded
from asserting constitutional rights under §
1983 when a remedial statutory scheme also
exists. In Smith v. Robinson, the Supreme
Court held that Congress intended the
Education of the Handicapped Act (“EHA”),
“to be the exclusive avenue through which a
plaintiff may assert an equal protection
claim to a publicly financed special
education.” The EHA was designed to “aid
the States in complying with their
constitutional obligations to provide public
education for handicapped children.” The
Act established “an enforceable substantive
right to a free appropriate public education”
and “an elaborate procedural mechanism to
protect the rights of handicapped
children.” Under the EHA, plaintiffs were
entitled to a fair and adequate state hearing,
detailed procedural safeguards, and judicial
review. Relying on the comprehensive
statutory scheme and legislative history, the
Supreme Court held that Congress did not
intend to allow a handicapped child to
bypass the EHA and go directly to court
with a § 1983 equal protection claim as
“such a result [would] render superfluous
most of the detailed procedural protections
in the statute.”
In Preiser v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court
considered whether state prisoners deprived
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of good-time credits could pursue their
claims for equitable relief under § 1983 or if
such a remedy was unavailable because of
the habeas corpus statutes. The Supreme
Court discussed the history of habeas corpus
and recognized that “over the years, the writ
of habeas corpus evolved as a remedy
available to effect discharge from any
confinement contrary to the Constitution or
fundamental law.” Procedurally, the writ
requires a prisoner to exhaust his adequate
state remedies prior to seeking federal
judicial relief. The Court held that Congress
intended habeas corpus to be the sole
remedy, as “[i]t would wholly frustrate
explicit congressional intent to hold that the
respondents in the present case could evade
this requirement by the simple expedient of
putting a different label on their pleadings.”
Although we have highlighted the four
opinions in Sea Clammers, Rancho Palos
Verdes, Smith, and Preiser, each of which
found a § 1983 claim precluded, the
Supreme Court does not “lightly conclude
that Congress intended to preclude reliance
on § 1983 as a remedy” for the deprivation
of a federal right. In fact, the Court has
rejected § 1983preclusion arguments in
several other cases.
Most recently, the Supreme Court
considered whether Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a), precludes a § 1983 equal
protection claim.
The Court first
acknowledged the importance of discerning
congressional intent and summarized its
prior rulings, stating:

In cases in which the § 1983 claim
alleges a constitutional violation, lack of
congressional intent may be inferred
from a comparison of the rights and
protections of the statute and those
existing under the Constitution. Where
the contours of such rights and
protections diverge in significant ways,
it is not likely that Congress intended to
displace §
1983suits
enforcing
constitutional rights. Our conclusions
regarding congressional intent can be
confirmed by a statute's context.
The Court also recognized that, in its prior
opinions finding preclusion, the statutes at
issue required plaintiffs to exhaust their
administrative remedies or comply with
other procedural requirements before filing
suit. “Offering plaintiffs a direct route to
court via § 1983 would have circumvented
these procedures and given plaintiffs access
to tangible benefits—such as damages,
attorney's fees, and costs—that were
unavailable under the statutes.”
Turning to the statute before it, the Supreme
Court examined Title IX's remedial scheme
and determined that Title IX does not
preclude a § 1983 equal protection claim.
Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis
of gender in educational programs that
receive federal financial assistance. Two
enforcement mechanisms exist: (1) “an
administrative procedure resulting in the
withdrawal of federal funding from
institutions that are not in compliance” and
(2) an implied private right of action,
through which a plaintiff may seek
injunctive relief and recover damages. A
plaintiff suing under Title IX is not required
to exhaust any administrative remedies or
provide notice before filing suit; instead,
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“plaintiffs can file directly in court and can
obtain the full range of remedies.” Further,
Congress failed to include an express private
right remedy, and the Court “has never held
that an implied right of action had the effect
of precluding suit under § 1983, likely
because of the difficulty of discerning
congressional intent in such a situation.”
The Court also emphasized the differences
between the protections guaranteed by Title
IX and the Equal Protection Clause. First,
Title IX permits a plaintiff to sue institutions
and programs receiving federal funding, but
does not authorize suit against school
officials, teachers, or other individuals. In
contrast, § 1983 equal protection claims
reach state actors, including individuals,
municipalities, and other state entities.
Second, some policies that are exempted
under Title IX could still be subject to
claims under the Equal Protection Clause.
Finally, the Court noted that “the standards
for establishing liability may not be wholly
congruent.” For example, a Title IX plaintiff
may only have to show that a school
administrator
acted
with
deliberate
indifference while a § 1983 plaintiff must
demonstrate the existence of a municipal
custom, policy, or practice. Because of these
differences and the absence of a
comprehensive remedial scheme, the
plaintiffs' § 1983 equal protection claim was
not precluded.
We conclude from these cases that, in
determining whether a § 1983 equal
protection claim is precluded by a statutory
scheme, the most important consideration is
congressional intent. Congressional intent
may be construed from the language of the

statute and legislative history, the statute's
context, the nature and extent of the
remedial scheme, and a comparison of the
rights and protections afforded by the
statutory scheme versus a § 1983 claim. A
statutory scheme may preclude a §
1983 constitutional claim, especially if a §
1983 claim circumvents the statute's
carefully tailored scheme and provides
access to benefits unavailable under that
scheme. Keeping these concepts in mind, we
now turn to the issue before us: whether the
ADEA precludes a § 1983 equal protection
claim.
C. ADEA Preclusion of § 1983 Claims
Congress enacted the ADEA “to promote
employment of older persons based on their
ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment; [and] to
help employers and workers find ways of
meeting problems arising from the impact of
age on employment.” The ADEA makes it
unlawful for an employer to “to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual
or otherwise discriminate against any
individual ... because of such individual's
age.” In general, the ADEA provides
coverage for private, state, and federal
employees who are forty years of age and
older, albeit with a few notable
exceptions. The Act “incorporates some
features of both Title VII and the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 [FLSA], which has
led [the Supreme Court] to describe it as
‘something of a hybrid.’ ” Specifically, the
substantive provisions of the ADEA are
modeled after Title VII, while its remedial
provisions incorporate provisions of the
FLSA.
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The ADEA expressly grants individual
employees a private right of action. An
ADEA plaintiff must first file a charge with
the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), generally within 180
days
of
the
unlawful
age
discrimination. The EEOC then notifies all
parties involved and, if the EEOC believes
there has been a violation, the agency
“promptly seek[s] to eliminate any alleged
unlawful practice by informal methods of
conciliation, conference, and persuasion.” If
the EEOC charge is dismissed or terminated,
the EEOC is required to notify the plaintiff.
Sixty days after filing an EEOC charge, a
plaintiff is entitled to file a civil lawsuit and,
if he seeks damages, receive a trial by jury.
This right terminates, however, if the EEOC
files its own lawsuit to enforce the plaintiff's
claim. “When confronted with a violation
of the ADEA, a district court is authorized
to afford relief by means of reinstatement,
backpay, injunctive relief, declaratory
judgment, and attorney's fees.” If a
violation was willful, a plaintiff may recover
liquidated damages. “The Act also gives
federal courts the discretion to ‘grant such
legal or equitable relief as may be
appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the
Act].’ ”
Whether the ADEA precludes a §
1983 equal protection claim is a matter of
first impression in the Seventh Circuit. All
other circuit courts to consider the issue
have held that the ADEA is the exclusive
remedy for age discrimination claims,
largely relying on the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning in Zombro v. Baltimore City
Police Department. District courts located

in other circuits, however, are split on the
issue. In the present case, two district court
judges from the Northern District of Illinois
held that the ADEA does not preclude a §
1983 equal protection claim.
In Zombro, the Fourth Circuit held that
allowing a plaintiff to seek recovery for age
discrimination through a § 1983 equal
protection claim would undermine the
comprehensive remedial scheme set forth in
the ADEA. Citing the ADEA's provisions
requiring notice to the EEOC, informal
conciliation, and termination of a plaintiff's
action upon the filing of a complaint by the
EEOC, the court believed that if a plaintiff
could pursue a § 1983 action instead, “[t]he
plaintiff would have direct and immediate
access to the federal courts, the
comprehensive
administrative
process
would be bypassed, and the goal of
compliance through mediation would be
discarded.” Where Congress has enacted a
comprehensive statutory scheme, such as the
ADEA, the Fourth Circuit holds that
preclusion of § 1983 suits is appropriate
“unless the legislative history of the
comprehensive statutory scheme in question
manifests a congressional intent to allow an
individual to pursue independently rights
under both the comprehensive statutory
scheme and other applicable state and
federal statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. §
1983.” The Fourth Circuit found no such
intent in the language and history of the
ADEA. That court also relied upon the
ADEA's adoption of Section 216 of the
FLSA, which has been held to be “the sole
remedy available to the employee for
enforcement of whatever rights he may have
under the FLSA.” To the court, this shared
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provision, along with the ADEA's precisely
drawn
statutory
scheme,
evidenced
congressional intent that the ADEA be the
exclusive remedy for age discrimination
suits.
Several circuit courts addressing ADEA
preclusion
have
simply
relied
on Zombro's holding. But not all district
court judges are convinced. The leading
district court case rejecting ADEA
preclusion of § 1983 equal protection claims
is Mummelthie v. City of Mason City, Iowa.
In that case, Judge Bennett sharply criticized
the
Fourth
Circuit's
analysis
in Zombro, noting that the court failed to
consider the statutory language and
legislative history of the ADEA, as well as
its similarities to Title VII, a statutory
scheme which does not preclude §
1983claims.
Given the conflicting case law, further
review of this issue is required. Although the
ADEA enacts a comprehensive statutory
scheme for enforcement of its own statutory
rights, akin to Sea Clammers and Rancho
Palos Verdes, we find that it does not
preclude a § 1983 claim for constitutional
rights. While admittedly a close call,
especially in light of the conflicting
decisions from our sister circuits, we base
our holding on the ADEA's lack of
legislative history or statutory language
precluding constitutional claims, and the
divergent rights and protections afforded by
the ADEA as compared to a § 1983 equal
protection claim.
1. Statutory Text and Legislative History

Nothing in the text of the ADEA expressly
precludes a § 1983 claim or addresses
constitutional rights.
Nor does the
legislative history provide clear guidance on
this issue. Although the Zombro court
interpreted this lack of explicit language or
legislative history as congressional intent
not to allow individuals to pursue
constitutional rights outside of the ADEA's
scheme, we reach the opposite conclusion.
Congress's silence on the issue tells us
nothing about preclusion—we do not know
whether
Congress
even
considered
alternative constitutional remedies in
enacting the ADEA.
We agree with the Zombro majority that the
ADEA sets forth a rather comprehensive
remedial scheme. The ADEA provides a
private right of action, requires notice and
exhaustion of remedies, and limits the
damages available under the Act. Like Sea
Clammers and Rancho Palos Verdes, this
scheme speaks volumes as to how Congress
intended allegations of statutory age
discrimination to proceed.
But, as to constitutional claims, we do not
believe Congress's intent is as apparent as
other circuit courts have found. As noted in
Mummelthie, “the ADEA does not purport
to provide a remedy for violation of federal
constitutional rights” and no express
language indicates that Congress intended to
foreclose
relief
under §
1983 for
constitutional violations. Beyond that, we
have a hard time concluding that Congress's
mere creation of a statutory scheme for age
discrimination claims was intended to
foreclose preexisting constitutional claims.
Congress frequently enacts new legal
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remedies that are not intended to repeal their
predecessors. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has emphasized on several occasions
that “repeals by implication are not favored
and will not be presumed unless the
intention of the legislature to repeal is clear
and manifest.”
What, then, do we make of the Supreme
Court's holdings in Smith and Preiser, which
held that constitutional claims were barred
by the existence of comprehensive statutory
schemes? In both of those cases, the statutes
at issue were specifically designed to
address constitutional issues. For instance,
the habeas corpus statutes in Preiser provide
a remedy for prisoners “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States. Similarly,
the Smith court acknowledged that “[t]he
EHA is a comprehensive scheme set up by
Congress to aid the States in complying
with their
constitutional
obligations to
provide public education for handicapped
children.” The statute itself provides that
federal intervention is necessary to “ensure
equal protection of the law.” This goal is
also referenced in the legislative history, as
recognized in Smith. These references
demonstrate that Congress considered
alternative constitutional remedies in
enacting the EHA.
The ADEA is readily distinguishable. “In
contrast to the statutes at issue
in Preiser and in Smith, the ADEA does not
purport to provide a remedy for violation of
constitutional rights. Instead, it provides a
mechanism to enforce only the substantive
rights created by the ADEA itself.” For the
preclusion of constitutional claims, we

believe more is required than a
comprehensive statutory scheme. This
notion is supported by the Supreme Court's
references in Smith to the legislative history
of the EHA. Thus, in Smith, it was more
than just the comprehensive remedial
scheme that convinced the Court that the
EHA is an exclusive remedy. In this
way, Smith differs
from Sea
Clammers and Rancho Palos Verdes, cases
tasked only with determining whether §
1983 statutory claims were precluded by that
statute's own comprehensive scheme. In
sum, even though the ADEA is a
comprehensive remedial scheme, without
some additional indication of congressional
intent, we cannot say that the ADEA's
scheme alone is enough to preclude § 1983
constitutional claims.
The
Ninth
Circuit's
recent Ahlmeyer decision
raises
one
additional point on this issue that
necessitates discussion, as the court relied
upon our prior precedent. As background,
because age is not a suspect classification,
an equal protection claim of age
discrimination in employment is subject
only to rational basis review, in which the
age classification must be rationally related
to a legitimate state interest. In contrast, the
ADEA “prohibits substantially more state
employment decisions and practices than
would likely be held unconstitutional under
the applicable equal protection, rational
basis standard.” Thus, the Ahlmeyer decision
notes in its opinion that “[b]ecause the
ADEA provides broader protection than the
Constitution, a plaintiff has ‘nothing
substantive to gain’ by also asserting a §
1983 claim.”
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In Williams, we briefly discussed the
plaintiffs' failure to differentiate their Title
VI and equal protection claims. Citing Sea
Clammers, we noted that “[w]hen Congress
enacts a comprehensive scheme for
enforcing a statutory right that is identical to
a right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
... the section 1983 lawsuit must be litigated
in accordance with the scheme.” We then
recognized that, according to the Supreme
Court, Title VI proscribes only those racial
classifications that violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Thus, there was nothing
to gain by asserting an equal protection
claim, and failure to comply with Title VI's
procedural requirements would have left the
plaintiffs without a remedy. But again,
like Smith, Title VI's legislative history
provides insight into Congress's intent. In
light of this clear congressional intent,
Williams (like Smith ) is also distinguishable
from the ADEA. And while we freely
acknowledge that the ADEA's heightened
scrutiny provides a stronger mechanism for
plaintiffs to challenge age discrimination in
employment,
absent
any
additional
indication from Congress, we simply cannot
infer that Congress intended to do away with
a § 1983 constitutional alternative.
Finally, the circuit courts rely upon
Congress's incorporation of the FLSA's
remedial scheme in finding that Congress
intended to preclude a § 1983 constitutional
remedy. This is a perplexing argument
because the cases which have found the
FLSA to be an exclusive remedy do not
(and, in fact, cannot) address constitutional
claims. Unlike Title VII and the ADEA, the
rights created by the FLSA are not based on
rights also guaranteed by the Constitution.

Thus, cases addressing FLSA exclusivity
speak little to the issue presently before this
court. We have no quarrel with the notion
that the FLSA is the sole remedy for the
enforcement of FLSA rights and, similarly,
the ADEA is the sole remedy for the
enforcement of ADEA rights. Even the
district courts that believe the ADEA does
not preclude § 1983 constitutional claims
agree on this point. Because the FLSA lacks
a constitutional counterpart, it provides little
additional guidance beyond the statutory
text.
2. Comparison of Rights and Protections
Given the absence of any clear or manifest
congressional intent in either the language of
the statute or the legislative history,
Fitzgerald directs us to compare the rights
and protections afforded by the statute and
the Constitution. We believe the rights and
protections afforded by the ADEA and §
1983 equal protection claims diverge in a
few significant ways.
First, an ADEA plaintiff may only sue his
employer, an employment agency, or a labor
organization. In contrast, a § 1983 plaintiff
may file suit against an individual, so long
as that individual caused or participated in
the alleged deprivation of the plaintiff's
constitutional rights. A § 1983 plaintiff may
also sue a governmental organization, but
only if he can demonstrate that the alleged
constitutional violation was “caused by (1)
an express municipal policy; (2) a
widespread, though unwritten, custom or
practice; or (3) a decision by a municipal
agent
with
final
policymaking
authority.” These divergent rights between
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the ADEA and a § 1983 constitutional claim
seriously affect a plaintiff's choice of
defendants and his strategy for presenting a
prima facie case.
Second, the ADEA expressly limits or
exempts claims by certain individuals,
including elected officials and certain
members of their staff, appointees, law
enforcement officers, and firefighters. The
statutory scheme also prohibits claims by
employees under the age of forty or those
bringing
so-called
“reverse
age
discrimination” claims. There are no such
limitations for § 1983 equal protection
claims.
Finally, as a practical matter in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Kimel, state
employees suing under the ADEA are left
without a damages remedy, as such claims
are barred by Eleventh Amendment
sovereign
immunity. In
contrast,
“[m]unicipalities do not enjoy any kind of
immunity from suits for damages under §
1983.” Without the availability of a §
1983 claim, a state employee (like Levin)
who suffers age discrimination in the course
of his employment is left without a federal
damages remedy.
In light of our analysis of the ADEA and the
relevant case law, and given these divergent
rights and protections, we conclude that the
ADEA is not the exclusive remedy for age
discrimination in employment claims.
D. Qualified Immunity
Because the ADEA does not preclude
Levin's § 1983 equal protection claim, we
now turn to the issue of qualified immunity.

We review a district court's denial of
summary judgment based on qualified
immunity de novo. To determine whether
state actors are entitled to qualified
immunity, we consider “(1) whether the
facts, taken in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, show that the defendants violated
a constitutional right; and (2) whether that
constitutional right was clearly established
at
the
time
of
the
alleged
violation.” Beyond asserting that the ADEA
precludes a § 1983 claim, the Individual
Defendants do not challenge the first prong
on appeal. Thus, for our purposes, we need
only briefly discuss the second prong of the
qualified immunity analysis.
“A right is clearly established when, at the
time of the challenged conduct, the contours
of a right are sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood
that what he is doing violates that right.”
Judge Coar's opinion granted qualified
immunity as to Levin's § 1983 equal
protection claim, finding that “whether the
Seventh Circuit permits equal protection
claims for age discrimination in light of the
ADEA is unclear.” Accordingly, Judge Coar
believed that the constitutional right was not
clearly established and qualified immunity
was appropriate. On reconsideration, Judge
Chang reversed Judge Coar's ruling, noting
that “irrational age discrimination is clearly
forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause”
and the issue of qualified immunity is “not a
question concerning whether a particular
procedural vehicle (i.e., cause of action) is
available.”
We agree with Judge Chang. At the time of
the alleged wrongdoing, it was clearly
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established that age discrimination in
employment violates the Equal Protection
Clause. Although age is not a suspect
classification, states may not discriminate on
that basis if such discrimination is not
“rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.” Whether or not the ADEA is the
exclusive remedy for plaintiffs suffering age
discrimination in employment is irrelevant,
and as Judge Chang noted, it is “odd to
apply qualified immunity in the context
where the procedural uncertainty arises from

the fact that Congress created a statutory
remedy for age discrimination that is
substantively broader than
the
equal
protection
clause.”
Because
Levin's
constitutional right was clearly established,
the Individual Defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court.
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“U.S. Supreme Court to Consider Application of ADEA to State and Local
Workers”
Lexology
Jennifer Cerven
April 2, 2013
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear
an appeal from Illinois Attorney General
Lisa Madigan on the issue of whether state
and local government employees can bypass
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
and sue for age discrimination under an
equal protection theory. The case
is Madigan v. Levin, Docket Number 12872.
Appellate courts are split on whether the
ADEA is the exclusive route for state and
local government employees to bring a
claim for age discrimination, or whether an
equal protection claim via Section 1983 is
available. The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals decided that the Plaintiff, a former
Assistant Attorney General, could go
forward with a Section 1983 age
discrimination claim against certain
defendants (including Madigan) in their
individual capacity. The Seventh Circuit
decided that the ADEA does not preclude a
Section 1983 claim, but acknowledged that
its decision was contrary to rulings in other
circuits holding that the ADEA is the
exclusive remedy for age discrimination
claims.
The question presented to the Supreme
Court is whether the Seventh Circuit erred in
holding that state and local government
employees may avoid the ADEA’s remedial
regime by bringing age discrimination

claims under the Constitution’s Equal
Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. 1`983.
In the petitioner’s brief asking the Supreme
Court to grant certiorari, Madigan noted the
circuit split and argued that if the Seventh
Circuit’s ruling were to stand, there would
be about one million state and local workers
in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin who
would be able to bypass the ADEA’s
administrative dispute resolution process at
the EEOC and go straight to court. Madigan
argued that this would undercut the ADEA
and would deprive state and local
governments of prompt notice of claims.
The outcome of the case will be important
not only for state and municipal employers,
but also for individual employees. As a
practical matter, the plaintiff could end up
with no further opportunity for an age
discrimination claim if the Supreme Court
decides that the ADEA forecloses age
claims under Section 1983. That is because
the lower court decided that the employee
fell under the ADEA exclusion of policymaking level employees, 29 U.S.C.
§630(f). Moreover, sovereign immunity
applies to protect states from individual suits
for monetary damages under the ADEA,
under Supreme Court precedent in Kimel v.
Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62.
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The case is likely to proceed to briefing
during the current term and may be
scheduled for argument in the fall term.
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“Supreme Court to Take on Age Discrimination: Madigan v. Levin”
Constitutional Law Reporter
Donald Scarinci
March 28, 2013
Now that the same-sex marriage oral
arguments are in the rear view, it is time to
focus on the remainder of the 2013 term.
While the remaining cases may not be as
groundbreaking, there are a number of
significant constitutional issues for the
Supreme Court to tackle.
For instance, the justices recently agreed to
take on age discrimination, one of the most
common types of employment lawsuits. The
specific issue before the Court is whether
state and local government employees can
avoid the federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) by bringing age
discrimination claims directly under the
Equal Protection Clause.
The Facts of the Case
Harvey N. Levin was terminated from his
position as an Illinois Assistant Attorney
General at the age of 61. After the office
replaced him with a younger lawyer, Levin
filed a lawsuit alleging that his termination
not only violated the ADEA, but also the
equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The defendants, who included the State of
Illinois, the Office of the Illinois Attorney
General, Illinois Attorney General Lisa
Madigan (in both her individual and official
capacity), and four other individual state
employees, sought to dismiss the
Constitutional claim. They argued that the

ADEA displaced all other remedies for age
discrimination claims.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed, holding that the ADEA does not
preclude
equal
protection
claims.
Accordingly, it denied the individual
defendants qualified immunity.
The Issues Before the Court
The Supreme Court likely agreed to hear the
case because the circuit courts have reached
divergent results when asked to consider this
issue. They are currently split 4-1, with the
Seventh Circuit departing from the others.
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “authorizes
suits to enforce individual rights under
federal statutes as well as the Constitution”
against state and local government officials.
However, in evaluating the limits of relief
available under § 1983 for statutory claims,
the Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen the
remedial devices provided in a particular
Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they
may suffice to demonstrate congressional
intent to preclude the remedy of suits under
§ 1983.”
Thus, the key question before the Court will
be whether Congress intended to limit other
remedies when including state and federal
employees under the protection of the
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ADEA, a determination the Supreme Court

generally does not take lightly.
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“Harvey Levin v. Lisa Madigan, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Decision”
JD Supra
Edward Theobald
August 17, 2012
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has ruled that Illinois Attorney
General Lisa Madigan and supervisors of the
Attorney General’s Office are not entitled to
qualified immunity from an Equal
Protection § 1983 Age Discrimination claim
brought by Harvey Levin, a former Senior
Assistant Attorney General.
A three-judge panel acknowledged that its
decision ran counter to rulings by six other
circuits that the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) precludes age
discrimination claims under the Equal
Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Seventh Circuit voted unanimously on
August 17, 2012 to affirm Northern District
of Illinois Judge Edmond Chang's July 2011
judgment in Levin v. Madigan. Judge
Michael Kanne wrote the opinion, joined by
Judges William Bauer and Richard Posner
citing “the ADEA's lack of legislative
history or statutory language precluding
constitutional claims, and the divergent
rights and protections afforded by the
ADEA as compared to a § 1983 equal
protection claim."
"In light of our analysis of the ADEA and
the relevant case law, and given these
divergent rights and protections, we
conclude that the ADEA is not the exclusive
remedy for age discrimination in
employment
claims,"
Judge
Kanne
concluded. As for qualified immunity, at the

time of the alleged violation "it was clearly
established that age discrimination in
employment violates the Equal Protection
Clause," he wrote. "Because Levin's
constitutional right was clearly established,
the Individual Defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity."
Harvey Levin was 55 years old in
September 2000, when he became an
assistant attorney general in the Illinois
Attorney General’s consumer fraud bureau.
Two years later, Illinois Attorney General
James Ryan promoted Mr. Levin to a senior
assistant attorney general. In May of 2006,
the new Illinois Attorney General, Lisa
Madigan, terminated Mr. Levin despite his
consistent written performance evaluations
that met or exceeded the Attorney General’s
expectations in a dozen job categories. Mr.
Levin was one of three consumer fraud
bureau lawyers who were discharged and
replaced with younger attorneys; Levin's
replacement was a woman in her 30’s.
U.S. District Court Judge Edmond E. Chang
has scheduled the jury trial on Harvey
Levin’s age and sex discrimination in
employment complaint for May 6, 2013 in
the U.S. District Courthouse, 219 S.
Dearborn Street, Room 1403, Chicago,
Illinois 60604.
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“High Court To Mull Circuit Split On Gov't Worker ADEA Claims”
Law 360
Bill Donahue
March 18, 2013
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
to weigh in on a circuit split over whether
state and local government employees can
directly sue for age discrimination under the
equal protection clause rather than follow
the out-of-court procedures of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.
The high court will review a Seventh Circuit
ruling that state workers were allowed to
bring age discrimination claims under the
14th Amendment. Other circuits have said
just the opposite — that the ADEA is the
exclusive remedy for claims of age-based
bias and that it forecloses constitutional
allegations.
The case is significant for government
employers because the ADEA mandates that
workers file claims with the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and
take other administrative steps before filing
a complaint. If employees can sue for
constitutional violations, they can bypass all
of
that.
As is customary, the court didn't indicate
why it chose to take the case, and Illinois
Attorney General Lisa Madigan — who
filed the petition for writ of certorari —
didn't immediately return a request for
comment
Monday.
Madigan filed her petition in January,
arguing that the Seventh Circuit's ruling in

August had exacerbated an alreadyconfusing divide among lower courts over
whether the ADEA precludes constitutional
age
bias
claims.
“This petition raises an important and
frequently recurring question over which of
the lower federal courts are hopelessly
divided,” the petition said. “The Seventh
Circuit acknowledged that its holding ...
created a split with the rule in several other
circuits [and] this court’s intervention is
needed to reconcile this growing, nationwide
split
in
authority.”
As Madigan explained in her petition, the
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
all ruled that Congress made the ADEA the
exclusive statutory vehicle for alleged age
bias. Those courts have rejected efforts to
sue under 42 USC § 1983 — the rule for
deprivation of constitutional or other legal
rights — as precluded by the ADEA.
And in other appeals court jurisdictions that
haven't addressed the issue, like the Second,
Third, Sixth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits,
district judges have ruled both ways, further
muddling the situation, the petition argued.
Madigan pushed the high court to come
down on the side of the courts that have
upheld the exclusivity of the ADEA, saying
that the Seventh's contrary view was
detrimental to the “proper functioning of the
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comprehensive scheme that Congress has
carefully crafted for resolving employment
disputes.”
“Congress decided that these disputes,
specifically, should be resolved wherever
possible through prompt notice and informal
conciliation rather than litigation,” the
petition said. “The more than one million
state and local workers located in Illinois,
Indiana and Wisconsin may [now] bypass
the ADEA’s dispute resolution process and
go straight to court, undercutting the act as a
means of securing voluntary compliance
with federal age discrimination laws,”
Madigan
argued.
Former assistant Illinois attorney general
Harvey N. Levin sued Madigan and her
office in 2007, claiming he had been fired
due to his age — he was 55 when terminated
— and replaced by a female attorney in her
thirties. He brought claims under both the

ADEA and the 14th Amendment, via 42
USC
§
1983.
When Illinois and Madigan moved to
dismiss the constitutional claims because
they were foreclosed by the ADEA, the
judge sided with Levin. In August, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed that ruling, setting
the stage for the Supreme Court to step in.
An attorney for Levin didn't return a request
for comment Monday on the grant of
certioari.
Madigan is represented by Illinois Solicitor
General
Michael
A.
Scodro.
Levin
is
represented
R. Theobald.

by

Edward

The case is Madigan v. Levin, case number
12-872, in the U.S. Supreme Court.
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“Supreme Court Stops Use of Key Part of Voting Rights Act”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes
June 25, 2013
A divided Supreme Court on Tuesday
invalidated a crucial component of the
landmark Voting Rights Act of 1965, ruling
that Congress has not taken into account the
nation’s racial progress when singling out
certain states for federal oversight.
The vote was 5 to 4, with Chief Justice John
G. Roberts Jr. and the other conservative
members of the court in the majority.
The court did not strike down the law itself
or the provision that calls for special
scrutiny of states with a history of
discrimination. But it said Congress must
come up with a new formula based on
current data to determine which states
should be subject to the requirements.
Proponents of the law, which protects
minority voting rights, called the ruling a
death knell. It will be almost impossible for
a Congress bitterly divided along partisan
lines to come up with such an agreement,
they said.
There could be immediate consequences
from the court’s ruling. Just hours after the
ruling, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott
said his state will move forward with a
voter-identification law that had been
stopped by a panel of federal judges and will
carry out redistricting changes that had been
mired in court battles.

Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
South Carolina, Texas and Virginia, as well
as Alaska, Arizona and parts of seven other
states. It requires them to receive “preclearance” from the U.S. attorney general or
federal judges before making any changes to
election or voting laws.
Roberts said the court had warned Congress
four years ago, in a separate case, that its
decision to continue using a formula based
on “40-year-old facts” would lead to serious
constitutional questions.
“Congress could have updated the coverage
formula at that time, but did not do so,”
Roberts wrote. “Its failure to act leaves us
today with no choice but to declare [the
formula] unconstitutional.”
He added, “Our country has changed, and
while any racial discrimination in voting is
too much, Congress must ensure that the
legislation it passes to remedy that problem
speaks to current conditions.”
He was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia,
Anthony M. Kennedy, Clarence Thomas and
Samuel A. Alito Jr.
One sign of racial progress has been the
election of the nation’s first African
American president, who said Tuesday that
he was “deeply disappointed” in the
decision.

The act covers the Southern states of
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“For nearly 50 years, the Voting Rights Act
. . . has helped secure the right to vote for
millions of Americans,” President Obama
said in a statement. “Today’s decision
invalidating one of its core provisions upsets
decades of well-established practices that
help make sure voting is fair, especially in
places where voting discrimination has been
historically prevalent.”
In Virginia, the state government
presumably will no longer need approval
from Washington for its new voter-ID law.
The law could still be subject to a legal
challenge, but the burden would be shifted
to plaintiffs to show that the law would hurt
minority voters.
Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr., who
called the decision a “serious setback for
voting rights,” said his department will
“continue to carefully monitor jurisdictions
around the country for voting changes that
may hamper voting rights.”
“Let me be very clear,” Holder said. “We
will not hesitate to take swift enforcement
action, using every legal tool that remains
available to us, against any jurisdiction that
seeks to take advantage of the Supreme
Court’s ruling by hindering eligible citizens’
full and free exercise of the franchise.”
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg emphasized the
liberals’ disagreement with the decision by
reading her dissent from the bench. She said
the majority not only misread the lessons of
the nation’s racial progress but also inserted
itself into a decision that the Constitution’s
Civil War amendments specifically leave for
Congress.

“When confronting the most constitutionally
invidious form of discrimination, and the
most fundamental right in our democratic
system, Congress’ power to act is at its
height,” Ginsburg wrote in her dissent.
She noted that the 2006 extension of the
Voting Rights Act, and the continued use of
the formula in Section 4, was approved
unanimously in the Senate and signed by
President George W. Bush. “What has
become of the court’s usual restraint?” she
asked from the bench.
She invoked the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.
and the march from Selma to Montgomery.
“ ‘The arc of the moral universe is long,’ he
said, ‘but it bends toward justice’ if there is
a steadfast commitment to see the task
through to completion,” Ginsburg said.
“That commitment has been disserved by
today’s decision.”
She was joined in dissent by Justices
Stephen G. Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and
Elena Kagan.
Roberts, too, was ready with history lessons.
In his opinion, he noted that in 1965, white
voter registration in Mississippi was nearly
70 percent and black registration stood at
6.7 percent. By 2004, a greater percentage of
blacks than whites were registered to vote in
the state, and that was true in five of the six
states originally covered by Section 5.
“These are the numbers that were before
Congress when it reauthorized the act in
2006,” he said.
Roberts cited the deaths of men registering
others to vote in Philadelphia, Miss., and
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“Bloody Sunday” in Selma, Ala. “Today
both of these towns are governed by
African-American mayors,” Roberts wrote.
Yet the “extraordinary and unprecedented
features” of Section 5, along with the
coverage formula, were reauthorized “as if
nothing had changed.”
Ginsburg said that the longtime formula
Congress decided to continue using still
identified the areas most in need of federal
oversight. Between 1982 and 2006, she said,
the Justice Department blocked more than
700 voting changes on the grounds that they
would be discriminatory.
She said the court’s ruling does not
accommodate the evidence Congress
amassed to justify reauthorization. “One
would expect more from an opinion striking
at the heart of the nation’s signal piece of
civil rights legislation,” Ginsburg wrote.
Roberts countered: “Congress did not use
the record it compiled to shape a coverage
formula grounded in current conditions. It
instead reenacted a formula based on 40year-old facts having no logical relation to
the present day.”
Reaction to the ruling was impassioned.
Edward Blum, who coordinated the current
challenge to Section 5 and a previous one in
2009, said the decision “restores an
important constitutional order to our system
of government which requires that all 50
states are entitled to equal dignity and
sovereignty. Our nation’s laws must apply
uniformly to each state and jurisdiction.”
Civil rights groups were outraged. “I think

we should not soft-pedal what is an
egregious betrayal of minority voters,” said
Sherrilyn Ifill, head of the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, whose lawyers participated in
the case.
In his opinion, Roberts noted that the
decision “in no way affects the permanent,
nationwide ban on racial discrimination in
voting” found in another part of the Voting
Rights Act. And he said that “Congress may
draft another formula based on current
conditions.”
But there appeared to be little bipartisan
appetite for that on Capitol Hill, and some
lawmakers said such an attempt would be
unsuccessful.
“As long as Republicans have a majority in
the House and Democrats don’t have 60
votes in the Senate, there will be no preclearance,” said Sen. Charles E. Schumer
(D-N.Y.). “It is confounding that after
decades of progress on voting rights, which
have become part of the American fabric,
the Supreme Court would tear it asunder,”
Schumer added.
The specific challenge before the court came
from Shelby County, Ala., a fast-growing,
mostly white suburb south of Birmingham.
A brief filed by the state of Alabama said
bloody resistance to African Americans’
voting rights was “particularly responsible”
for making Section 5 necessary.
The state’s attorney general, Luther Strange,
said in the brief that Alabama had a wellearned
place
among
the
covered
jurisdictions when the act was passed in
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1965 and reauthorized in 1970, 1975 and
1982. But the 2006 reauthorization, which
extended federal control for an additional 25
years, went too far, he said.

covered jurisdictions to resume their roles as
equal and sovereign parts of these United
States,” the brief said.
The case is Shelby County v. Holder.

“It is time for Alabama and the other
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“U.S. Chief Justice Realizes Longstanding Vision in Voting-Rights Case”
Reuters
Joan Biskupic
June 25, 2013
For an often enigmatic figure at the U.S.
Supreme Court, Chief Justice John Roberts
spoke to the essence of his legal philosophy
on Tuesday in eliminating a voting-rights
provision enacted to protect blacks and other
minorities.

fifth vote to uphold the healthcare overhaul
sponsored by President Barack Obama. But
some legal analysts observed that such a
case, testing federal commerce and taxing
power, did not touch on his long-held
conservative priorities.

His opinion for the court marks the
culmination of an effort by conservatives,
many of whom, like Roberts, cut their teeth
in the Ronald Reagan administration, to
ensure that federal voting requirements on
the states be limited and race-based rules
fade in contemporary America.

When Roberts served as a lawyer in the
Reagan administration, he sought to curtail
government's use of racial remedies and
specifically narrow the reach of the Voting
Rights Act. In 1982, for example, Roberts
advised the president to oppose pending
legislation to enhance a section aimed at
intentional voter discrimination.

In a tenure-defining decision, the Roberts
majority undercut a key section of the 1965
Voting Rights Act that requires states with a
history of racial discrimination to obtain
U.S. approval before changing election laws.
The court struck down the formula used to
determine which states were affected. Nine
mostly Southern states had been covered.
The decision was the most significant racial
ruling since Roberts, 58, became chief
justice in 2005. Announced on the next-tolast day of term, Shelby County v. Holder
was one of the most awaited of the current
session and as Roberts spoke from the
bench, the hushed courtroom felt quieter
than usual.
CONSERVATIVE PRIORITIES
Last year at this time, Roberts defied many
people's expectations when he provided the

Roger Clegg, who worked with Roberts at
the Justice Department in the 1980s, said
Roberts, like other young Republican
lawyers, was inspired by a broad socially
conservative agenda that included such
subjects as abortion, religion and race.
"These were the big-ticket items back then,"
said Clegg, now president of the Center for
Equal Opportunity, a conservative think
tank. Clegg added that he did not think
Roberts, who grew up in Indiana and was
educated at Harvard, was motivated in his
quest for race-neutral policies by especially
Southern sympathies.
"This is not driven by the fact that his great,
great grandfather was with (Confederate
General Robert E.) Lee at Appomattox,"
said Clegg, referring to one of the final
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battles of the Civil War. "It's from his belief
in federalism," that is, a limit on what
Congress may constitutionally impose on
the states.
Once he joined the high court, as an
appointee of Republican President George
W. Bush, Roberts asserted his opposition to
racial policies. In a 2006 case involving the
drawing of "majority minority" voting
districts to boost the political power of
blacks and Latinos, Roberts referred to "this
sordid business divvying us up by race." In a
2007 dispute over school integration plans,
Roberts wrote, "The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race."
In a 2009 case, in which the court ultimately
declined to review the constitutionality of
the key Voting Rights Act section, Roberts
warned that the screening provision may no
longer be constitutional because "things
have changed in the South."
He questioned why Congress would still
target Southern states when widespread
blatant racial discrimination had ended. Can
members of Congress "impose this disparate
treatment forever because of the history in
the South?" he asked during oral arguments
in the 2009 case. "When do they have to
stop?"
On Tuesday, Roberts provided an answer:
Now.
In his 24-page opinion for the court, Roberts
criticized Congress for leaving in place the
criteria for targeted states that traced to the

1960s and early 1970s, despite the gains in
voting equality since then. Voicing irritation
that lawmakers had not acted on the court's
warning in 2009 to revise the formula used
to determine which states were covered,
Roberts said it had no choice but to strike it
down.
As he wrote about the changes across the
country in recent decades, the chief justice
noted that voter registration rates for blacks
and whites now approach parity and blatant
discrimination is rare.
"Our country has changed, and while any
racial discrimination in voting is too much,
Congress must ensure that the legislation it
passes to remedy that problem speaks to
current conditions," Roberts wrote, joined
by his four fellow conservatives.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, speaking for
the four liberal dissenters, said the states
targeted four decades ago still had the worst
voting-rights violations. She invoked the
words of slain civil rights leader Martin
Luther King, Jr.: " 'The arc of the moral
universe is long, he said, but ‘it bends
toward justice,' if there is a steadfast
commitment to see the task through to
completion. That commitment has been
disserved by today's decision."
In the cool marble courtroom on a scorching
June morning, Roberts was expressionless.
After decades of tension over the scope of
voting rights, he had his majority.
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“U.S. Sues To Block Texas Law On Voter ID”
The Wall Street Journal
Jess Bravin
August 27, 2013
The Justice Department on Thursday sued
Texas over the state's voter-identification
law and said it would join an existing case
challenging congressional districts drawn by
Austin's Republican-controlled legislature,
alleging that both measures violate the 1965
Voting Rights Act and constitutional
protections for minorities.
The lawsuits come after the U.S. Supreme
Court in June ended nearly a half-century of
direct federal supervision of election
practices in states that historically
discriminated against minority voters. The
5-to-4 decision found that historical data no
longer justified requiring Texas and other
such states to obtain federal permission
before changing election procedures.
But the opinion left intact federal law
authorizing voting-rights suits against state
and local election laws after they are
enacted. It also allowed courts to impose
new "preclearance" requirements on
jurisdictions found to discriminate against
minority voters.
The Obama administration had pledged to
use those powers vigorously, and on
Thursday Attorney General Eric Holder said
the
Texas
suits
underscored
that
commitment.
"We will not allow the Supreme Court's
recent decision to be interpreted as open
season for states to pursue measures that

suppress voting rights," Mr. Holder said in a
statement. "This represents the department's
latest action to protect voting rights, but it
will not be our last."
Texas Gov. Rick Perry called the suit "an
effort to obstruct the will of the people of
Texas," adding, "We will continue to defend
the integrity of our elections."
The Justice Department previously had
rejected the voter-ID law, a decision upheld
by a federal court in Washington. That
ruling was nullified by the Shelby County
ruling, which eliminated the formula that
had placed Texas under the preclearance
requirement.
The Texas law requires voters to present one
of five forms of photo ID. A driver's license,
passport or concealed-handgun license
issued by the state Department of Public
Safety are among the accepted forms of ID,
while student cards aren't accepted. People
who can prove their eligibility to vote with a
birth certificate or other documents can
obtain a special voter-identification card.
The Justice Department said the law, signed
by Mr. Perry in 2011, would disadvantage
minority voters. For instance, the
department said Hispanic registered voters
are more than twice as likely as nonHispanic registered voters to lack a driver's
license.
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The administration also said it would join
the redistricting suit, which was filed in
2011 by civil-rights organizations and Texas

voters, and is pending before a federal court
in San Antonio.
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“U.S. Asks Court to Limit Texas on Ballot Rules”
The New York Times
Adam Liptak & Charlie Savage
July 25, 2013
The Obama administration on Thursday
moved to protect minority voters after last
month’s Supreme Court ruling striking
down a central part of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, with the Justice Department asking
a court to require Texas to get permission
from the federal government before making
changes.
In a speech before the National Urban
League in Philadelphia, Attorney General
Eric H. Holder Jr. said the request would be
the first of several legal salvos from the
administration in reaction to the Supreme
Court’s decision. “My colleagues and I are
determined to use every tool at our
disposal,” he said, “to stand against such
discrimination wherever it is found.”
Last month’s ruling, Shelby County v.
Holder, did away with a requirement that
Texas and eight other states, mostly in the
South, get permission from the Justice
Department or a federal court before
changing election procedures. On Thursday,
the administration asked a federal court in
Texas to restore that “preclearance”
requirement there, citing the state’s recent
history and relying on a different part of the
voting rights law.
Republicans
harshly
criticized
the
announcement, in a sign that both parties
view the battle over voting laws as
important to future elections.

Gov. Rick Perry of Texas cast Mr. Holder’s
remarks as an attempt by the Obama
administration to weaken the state’s voterintegrity laws and said the comments
demonstrated the administration’s “utter
contempt for our country’s system of checks
and balances.”
“This end run around the Supreme Court
undermines the will of the people of Texas,
and casts unfair aspersions on our state’s
common-sense efforts to preserve the
integrity of our elections process,” Mr. Perry
said in a statement.
For years, Republicans across the nation
have pushed for tougher voter identification
laws, shorter voting hours and other
measures they say are intended to reduce
voter fraud. The efforts have intensified
across the South, from Texas to North
Carolina, after the Supreme Court’s ruling
freed many states and localities from federal
oversight.
Democrats have said the steps are intended
to reduce voting by minorities, students and
other heavily Democratic groups.
State Representative Trey Martinez Fischer,
Democrat of San Antonio, who is the
chairman of the Mexican-American
Legislative
Caucus,
said
racial
discrimination in Texas was not a thing of
the past.
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“The fact that intervention in Texas is the
Department of Justice’s first action to
protect voting rights following the Shelby
County decision speaks volumes about the
seriousness of Texas’ actions,” Mr. Fischer
said.

government to get to largely the same place
by a different route, called “bail-in.” If the
department can show that given jurisdictions
have committed constitutional violations,
federal courts may impose federal oversight
on those places in a piecemeal fashion.

“Texans should be proud that the resources
of the federal government will be brought to
bear to protect the voting rights of all,” he
added.

Lawyers for minority groups have already
asked a court in Texas to return the state to
federal oversight. The Justice Department’s
action — filing a “statement of interest” in
that case — will bring the weight of the
federal government behind those efforts.

President Obama mentioned his concern
about voting problems — especially long
waits at the ballot box — in both his victory
speech on the night of his re-election and in
his second Inaugural Address. Several recent
polls and studies found that voters in heavily
Democratic areas face longer lines, although
the reasons remain unclear.

Richard H. Pildes, a New York University
professor who specializes in election law
issues, said the move was “a dramatically
significant moment in the next phase of the
Voting Rights Act’s development” after the
Supreme Court’s ruling.

The new move by the Justice Department
relies on a part of the Voting Rights Act that
the Supreme Court left untouched in the
Shelby County case. The court struck down
the coverage formula in Section 4 of the
law, which had identified places subject to
the preclearance requirement based on 40year-old data. The court suggested that
Congress remained free to enact a new
coverage formula based on contemporary
data, but most analysts say that is unlikely.

“If this strategy works, it will become a way
of partially updating the Voting Rights Act
through the courts,” he said. “The Justice
Department is trying to get the courts to step
into the role the Justice Department played
before the Shelby County decision. The
Voting Rights Act has always permitted this,
in some circumstances, but this strategy
wasn’t used much. If this approach works, it
will help update the Voting Rights Act even
without Congressional action.”

Striking down the law’s coverage formula
effectively guts Section 5 of the law, which
requires permission from federal authorities
before covered jurisdictions may change
voting procedures.

In his speech, Mr. Holder said that evidence
submitted to a court last year that the Texas
Legislature had intentionally discriminated
against Hispanics when redrawing district
lines was sufficient to reimpose on that state
the “preclearance” safeguard. The court
blocked the map, saying the parties had
“provided more evidence of discriminatory

The move by the Justice Department on
Thursday relies on a different part of the
law, Section 3, which allows the federal
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intent than we have space, or need, to
address here.”
The department may also soon bring similar
legal action against Texas over its voter
identification law, which was also blocked
by a federal court last year. Hours after the
Supreme Court’s ruling in the Shelby
County case, the state said it would begin
enforcing the law.

“This issue transcends partisanship, and we
must work together,” Mr. Holder continued.
“We cannot allow the slow unraveling of the
progress that so many, throughout history,
have sacrificed so much to achieve.”

Richard L. Hasen, a professor at the
University of California, Irvine, who
specializes in election law, said Thursday’s
filing was a “huge deal showing that the
department is going to be aggressive in
seeking to resurrect what it can of the old
preclearance regime” adding that “getting
the state of Texas covered again would be
important not just symbolically but
practically, as it would put its tough new
voter ID law back on hold.”
But Professor Hasen added that trying to
“bail in” jurisdictions under Section 3 was
not a substitute for Section 5’s
comprehensive oversight requirements for
all of the areas it covered.
“This is a clunky way to cover only a subset
of jurisdictions found to be intentionally
discriminating — a tough legal standard to
prove,” he said. “And courts have discretion
to grant or not grant bail-in, and to fashion
the remedy as they see fit.”
Mr. Holder urged Congress to reimpose
more general preclearance requirements.
The bail-in procedure, he said, is “no
substitute for legislation that will fill the
void left by the Supreme Court’s decision.”
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